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The existing INFOCON system is an information warning system that the DOD 
maintains.  It is not formally correlated to other warning systems, such as DEFCON, 
FPCON/THREATCON, WATCHCONs, SANS INFOCON, or the Homeland Security 
Advisory System Threat condition.  The criteria for each INFOCON level are subjective.  
The INFOCON recommended actions are a mix of policy and general technical 
measures.  The INFOCON system vaguely follows the Defense in Depth network defense 
methodology. 
This thesis examines the foundations for the existing INFOCON system and 
presents an evolved INFOCON system.  The focus will be on the security of the DOD 
information infrastructure and the accomplishment of the mission, as well as the usability 
and the standardization of the INFOCON warning system.  The end result is a prototype 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DOD) commissioned research in the 1960’s into 
developing new electromagnetic pulse (EMP) proof networking technology.  The 
research became known as the ARPANET, because the project was funded by the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency.  The ARPANET grew to connect military agencies, 
universities, and national laboratories.  When the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
and Internet Protocol (IP) were adopted for the ARPANET, several common terms were 
formed.  An internet is a set of TCP/IP connected networks.  The proper noun name 
Internet (with capital ‘i’) was coined for the ARPANET to describe the connected 
TCP/IP internets. [FU03, ZA01, GM01] 
It wasn’t until 1984 that computer viruses were seen as a potential widespread 
problem for the Internet.  The first large-scale attack against computers connected to the 
Internet was the “Internet worm” that was launched in 1988. So, before the first 
commercial provider of Internet (not the ARPANET)1 dial-up access went on-line in 
1990, there had already been attacks against computers on the Internet.  By 1995, 
traditional, online, dial-up services, such as America Online and Prodigy, began to 
provide Internet access.  [FU03, ZA01, GM01]   
In a report in 1996, the Defense Science Board identified a need for structured 
responses to attacks on the Nation's information infrastructure. That same year 
Information Assurance (IA) was defined as: 
Information Operations that protect and defend information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
non-repudiation.  This includes providing for the restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities. [CN01] 
Information Operations are the actions taken to affect an adversary’s information 
and Information Systems (IS) while defending one’s own information and 
Information Systems. [CN01, DE02] 
                                                 
1 Dial up networks that provided limited access to the ARPANET were available in the 1970’s.[DI02]  
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 The Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) system was implemented in 
1999.  It recommends actions and raises the awareness and information assurance 
standards to the appropriate level of readiness to meet expected cyber threats and attacks 
against the DOD information infrastructure (DII). This infrastructure includes computer 
and telecommunications networks and systems.  The INFOCON system provides a 
hierarchy of protection profiles that should be implemented to defend networks. [KE01, 
RA02]. These are not the same INFOCON levels as those from the SANS Institute.2 
[SY01] 
 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
1. Scope and Assumptions 
This thesis will assess the existing INFOCON levels to ascertain the specific 
threats indicated by each, then proceed to and define a set of security safeguards that are 
appropriate threat-mitigation responses for each of the threat levels. A prototype, proof-
of-concept set of configuration scripts will be developed shown that effect the set of 
safeguards by modifying the security profile of three network/networked devices/tools 
(e.g., change a gateway router’s filter rule-set, change the auditing granularity that the 
Syslog server receives, or have a switch block specific port). The groundwork laid by this 
thesis could potentially lead to additional research that, in turn would leads to a dynamic 
implementation of a Quality of Security Service (QoSS) architecture. This thesis will 
make no attempt to create an artificially intelligent agent that will automatically control 
the entire process of detecting threats and reconfiguring the network’s defensive posture 
in real-time; nor will there be a comprehensive protection mechanism developed.   
This research will define sets of network security safeguard measures that are 
appropriate to counter the explicit and implicit threats posed by each of the existing 
INFOCON threat levels. The research will develop a proof-of-concept set of 
configuration scripts that alter the defensive security posture of 2-3 network/networked 
devices/services (e.g., router, server, switch).  
 
                                                 
2 For detailed information regarding SANS Infocon, please visit http://isc.sans.org/ (February 2004) or 
http://www.sans.org  (February 2004). 
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2. Research Questions  
This thesis will answer the following questions. 
• How are the INFOCON levels defined? 
o By the perceived threat? 
o By what that threat is directed against? 
o By mitigation response measures? 
• How are the INFOCON levels demarcated? 
o What criteria constitutes the “cutoff” between each layer? 
o Is there a common “theme” to each layer that could be leveraged when 
choosing the appropriate set of safeguard techniques to apply? 
• What is the current landscape of network defense methodologies? 
o Is it predominantly ad-hoc, or is there a pre-defined escalation approach? 
o What defense mechanisms, if any, lend themselves to an automated 
invocation and/or re-configuration?  
• What is the appropriate tactical response to each of the INFOCON 
levels? 
• What security-implementing devices/services would make good 
candidates for implementing the security scripts? 
• Can the safeguard scripts be centrally managed?  
 
C. ORGANIZATION OF PAPER 
1. Characterization of Existing Warning Systems 
Some of the existing warning systems and their relationship to each other and the 
INFOCON system will be discussed. 
2. Analysis of Existing INFOCON Systems 
The INFOCON levels will be analyzed to characterize each level and determine 
the method of demarcation.  The relationship among some of the existing warning 
systems, to include the INFOCON, will also be analyzed. 
3. Analysis of Network Defense Methodologies 
Defense methodologies currently in existence will be analyzed with particular 
emphasis being given to those methodologies specific to the DOD. 
4. Recommendations 
Define an evolutionary INFOCON system that satisfies the goal of the existing 
INFOCON system.  The new INFOCON system should improve usability, feasibility, 
and the security of the DOD information infrastructure.  The safeguard measures that are 
presented should be specific, technical, and feasible.  The measures will be roughly 
  4
categorized by their functional area.  In each area, the safeguard measures will be mapped 
to the devices/tools which will implement them.  The criteria for selecting the prototype 
devices/tools will be discussed.  The devices will include a gateway router, a managed 
switch, and a Syslog server. 
5. Development of Safeguard Measures Scripts 
For each device/service, a safeguard script will be developed for each of the 
suggested INFOCON threat levels that effects the suggested safeguard measures for that 
level. 
6. Conclusions 
Summarize the evolved INFOCON system and its benefits. Present the 
conclusions, including the feasibility of the evolved system and any future work.  The 











II. CHARACTERIZATION OF EXISTING WARNING SYSTEMS 
There are many warning systems in existence in the United States and the world.  
Most of these were created and used by United States Government organizations.  The 
information revolution has caused the corporate sector to create their own information 
warning systems as well. This chapter will only cover those systems that should directly 
relate to, or influence, the protection of information that falls under the purview of the 
U.S. Government; with an added focus on DOD-specific warning systems. [AD01, FA01, 
FA02, RA01, RA02, US01, WE01] 
 
A. INFOCON 
The INFOCON system is a defensive warning system for the DOD based on 
military operations, the intelligence assessment of adversary capabilities and intent, 
information network indicators, and the status of information systems.3 It is a system of 
progressive levels of the probability of attack and its impact to military operations.  The 
corresponding response measures are mostly reactionary. They are meant to include 
preventive actions, reactive actions taken during an attack, and mitigating, damage 
control actions.  Reactive actions during the attack would be those to stop an attack, 
where as mitigating actions are actions to limit or reverse damage to the system. [LU01, 
OF01, RA01, RA02, US01, WE01] 
 There are five INFOCON levels.  The range from lowest to highest is Normal 
through Delta.  Each level has criteria.  One or more of the criterion of that level must be 
met to substanstiate a change to that level. The criteria for each level are broad guidance 
to consider, not firm rules.   Also, each level has recommended actions, which are the 
response measures to the expected threat. The system is maintained by the Joint Task 
Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO).  The criteria, recommended 
actions, authority, applicability, and procedures are detailed further in Chapter 3. [LU01, 
OF01, RA01, RA02, US01] 
                                                 
3For more information please visit http://207.133.209.84/amc/ci/matrix/documents/cjcs_level/cjcs-
infocon.pdf February 2004. 
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Figure 1.   INFOCON Levels. 
 
B. SANS INFOCON 
The SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security (SANS) Institute maintains its own 
INFOCON system in conjunction with its Internet Storm Center.4  This system is 
intended to indicate the condition of the Internet infrastructure, not monitor particular 
nations or companies.5  It reflects changes in malicious traffic and the possibility of 
connectivity disruption.  [SANS00] 
There are four levels in this system, indicated by color.  The lowest level is green, 
indicating and the situation is normal with no known threats.  The next level is yellow, 
indicating that SANS is tracking a significant new threat whose impact is not known or is 
expected to be minor to the Internet infrastructure. At this level, SANS advises users to 
take immediate action to contain the impact.   Orange is the next level and indicates that a 
major disruption in Internet connectivity is imminent or in progress, but there is no action  
specified by SANS.  The highest level, red, indicates a loss of connectivity across a large 
part of the Internet infrastructure, but again, with no remedial action specified by SANS.  
[SANS00] 
                                                 
4 For detailed information regarding SANS Infocon, please visit http://isc.sans.org/ (February 2004) or 
http://www.sans.org (February 2004) 
5 For information regarding the authority, applicability, and procedures please visit 




THREATCON is the acronym for the terrorist threat condition.6  It is a 
standardized system of threat conditions that describes five progressive levels of 
protective measures implemented by the DOD in response to terrorist threats to all U.S. 
Military personnel and facilities.  This is not the ThreatCon as defined by Symantec 
Corporation.  Because of the confusion with the Department of State’s Threat Levels, the 
name THREATCON was replaced by FPCON in Jun 2001.  [AD01, AN01, DI01, 
DOD02, EU01, FA01, ST03, US01, US02, WE01] 
2. FPCON 
FPCON is the acronym for the force protection condition.  Though the name 
changed from THREATCON, the system, individual classifications and measures remain 
the same.78 The FPCON system has five levels.  Incidentally, the levels have the same 
names as the INFOCON levels.  The levels are Normal, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta.  
The measures for the levels, also like the INFOCON level recommended actions, build 
upon the prior level.  [AN01, DI01, DOD02, DT02, EU01, FA01, ST03, US01, US02, 
WE01] 
                                                 
6 For more details: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/app-J_THREATCON.htm (February 2004) 
7 Please see http://www.angelfire.com/ca7/Security/threatcon.html (February 2004) for more details 
8 Please see http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d200012_081803/d200012p.pdf (February 




Figure 2.   FPCON Levels. 
 
The FPCON Normal level is indicated when there is no discernable terrorist 
activity.  Because there always exists a general threat of possible terrorist activity, a 
routine security posture is warranted.  Its recommended actions are to secure areas when 
not in use, maintain positive control of identification, and be aware of local anti-
government demonstrations. [AN01, EU01, DOD02, FA01, JO01, ST03, US02, WE01] 
If the threat of terrorist attack is low, meaning there are general, nonspecific 
threats of terrorist activity against personnel and/or facilities of unpredictable nature and 
unknown extent, then FPCON level Alpha is indicated.  This level must be maintainable 
indefinitely with only limited impact on operations. Though the circumstances don’t 
justify full implementation of FPCON Bravo, it may be necessary to implement certain 
measures from higher FPCON levels as a deterrent or because of intelligence received.  
See Appendix D, FPCON, for the complete listing of recommended actions for this level.  
[AN01, EU01, DOD02, FA01, JO01, ST03, US02, WE01] 
FPCON Bravo is indicated when an increased and more predictable threat of 
terrorist activity exists, but no specific threat has been identified.  This level’s 
recommended measures must be maintainable for several weeks without substantially 
affecting operational capabilities, causing undue hardship to personnel, or aggravating 
relations with local authorities, members of the local civilian, or host nation community.  
  9
See Appendix D, FPCON, for the complete listing of recommended actions for this level.  
[AN01, EU01, DOD02, FA01, JO01, ST03, US02, WE01] 
The next level, FPCON Charlie, is indicated when intelligence indicates that a 
threat action against personnel and facilities is imminent or an incident has occurred.  If 
Charlie’s recommended measures are implemented for more than a short duration, then 
hardships will probably be created and peacetime activities for personnel and units will 
be affected.  [AN01, EU01, DOD02, FA01, JO01, ST03, US02, WE01] 
Finally, FPCON Delta is indicated in the immediate area when intelligence 
indicates terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely or when a threat 
attack has occurred.  The implementation of FPCON Delta is normally for only limited 
duration over specific, localized areas.  This condition will cause significant personnel 
hardships and substantial peacetime mission capability reduction if sustained for 
extended durations. [AN01, EU01, DOD02, FA01, JO01, ST03, US02, WE01] 
 
D. HSAS THREAT CONDITIONS  
The Homeland Security Advisory System, HSAS, is a product of the newly 
formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS).9 It provides a nationwide, 
comprehensive, effective means of disseminating information regarding the risk of 
terrorist acts.  It provides warnings using the graduated Threat Conditions, which that 
increase as the risk of the threat increases.  Each Threat Condition has a corresponding 
set of Protective Measures.  These Protective Measures are in addition to each agency’s 
or department’s specific measures.  Federal agencies and departments implement the 
corresponding Protective Measures to best reduce their vulnerability or increase their 
response capability for the indicated threat level.  The Threat Conditions are assigned by 
the Attorney General of the United States of America in consultation with the Assistant to 
the President for Homeland Security.  The DHS directive that describes the HSAS may 
be found in Appendix E, Homeland Security Advisory System.10 [WH01] 
                                                 
9 For more information, see http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/  (February 2004) 
10 The authority, applicability, and procedures for the HSAS Threatcon can be found in Appendix E. 
  10
 
Figure 3.   HSAS Levels. 
 
There are also five HSAS Threat Conditions.  Higher threat conditions indicate 
both a higher likelihood of attack, in addition to an expectation of greater severity per 
attack. Each Threat Condition is identified by a descriptor and corresponding color.  
[WH01] 
The lowest Threat Condition is Low, which is represented by the color green.  It 
is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. The next level is Guarded and it is 
represented by the color blue.  The Guarded condition is declared when there is a general 
risk of terrorist attacks.  It is followed by Elevated, which is represented by the color 
yellow.  This condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks.  
The level High, is the second highest level .and is represent by the color orange.  A High 
condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks.  Finally, the highest 
level, Severe, is represented by the color red.  It reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. 
This level’s protective measures aren’t intended to be sustained for substantial durations 






DEFCON is the acronym for Defense Readiness Condition.  This system 
describes progressive alert postures, which are primarily used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the commanders of unified commands.11  These conditions are phased increases in 
combat readiness.  They are graduated to match situations of varying military severity.  
[FA02, SC01, ST03] 
 There are five DEFCON levels, from 1 to 5.  The lowest is DEFCON 5, which is 
normal, peacetime readiness.  DEFCON 4 is normal, peacetime readiness, but with 
increased intelligence and strengthened security measures.  An increase in force readiness 
above normal readiness is implemented at DEFCON 3.   A further increase in force 
readiness that is less than the maximum readiness is set at DEFCON 2.  The maximum 
force readiness is DEFCON 1.  [FA02, SC01, ST03] 
 
F. WATCHCONS 
These are classified warning systems from the intelligence communities.12  These 
systems will only receive cursory coverage here due to the classified nature of their 
domain. Both systems have five levels.  The level descriptions are 1 to 5.  WATCHCON 
5 is normal conditions without any unusual military movements. Level 4 of the 
WATCHCON is normal conditions with a potential threat that requires continued 
surveillance.  There is a concern for an increased threat against the national security at 
WATCHCON 3.  Signs of eminent danger and significant threat to national interest are 
WATCHCON 2.  WATCHCON 1 is a clear immediate threat of enemy attack. [GL01, 
IE01, KE01, KE02] 
1. WATCHCON  
The Watch Condition, or WATCHCON, system is a defensive warning system 
based on the intelligence community’s degree of concern regarding a particular warning 
issue.  [KE01, KE02, RA02] 
                                                 
11Please see  http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/defcon.htm (February 2004) for more information 
for more information.  Minimal information found on authority, applicability, and procedures. 
12 No information could be found regarding the authority, applicability, and procedures for the 
WATCHCONs. 
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2. CNA-WATCHCON  
The Computer Network Attack Watch Condition, or CNA-WATCHCON, system 
is another warning system based on assessment of intelligence that includes the overall 
political situation and the CNA threat levels.  [KE01, KE02, RA02] 
 
G. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE WARNING SYSTEMS 
Each of the systems discussed, are systems currently in use in the United States.  
The FPCON levels represent the defensive condition of the United States military and its 
assets abroad.  The Homeland Security Advisory System represents the preparedness and 
readiness of the United States against the terrorist threat.  The DEFCON levels represent 
the United States’ military preparedness for the likelihood of war.  The WATCHCONs 
represent the intelligence community’s concern regarding a specific problem in the 
world.  The SANS INFOCON represents the condition of the world’s Internet 
infrastructure.  The INFOCON levels represent the United States Department of 
Defense’s preparedness and readiness for the intentional disruption of DOD information 
systems.  [FA02, NA02, NA04, RA01, RA02, SC01, WE01] 
 
Figure 4.   Scope of warning systems. 
 
All of the systems are roughly analogous.  Each is defined by one or more 
combinations of: an assessed threat, the capability to implement the necessary protective 
measures, and the overall risk to the organizations.    
Does one system influence another?  It would be assumed that each affects the 
others because all of the systems relate to very broad factors that contribute to the all-
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around defensive preparedness of the United States.  Thus, all of the more general 
coverage warning systems should have some form of impact on the more specific 
INFOCON level: more specific because it addresses threats specifically to information. 
The inverse does not hold true; i.e., the INFOCON level would not always be expected to 
influence the other systems.  This because some of the other warning systems are focused 
on their specific task and the INFOCON doesn’t fall into that task.  This thesis is 
interested in what drives the INFOCON level, so as to better define the appropriate 
measures for each level.   [FA02, NA02, RA01, RA02, SC01, WE01]   
 
 
Figure 5.   Collective Stimulus of Warning Systems on the INFOCON System. 
 
The FPCON and HSAS Threat Condition levels are both defined by terrorist 
threats and activity, which that should link the two systems closely together.  Also, 
because the HSAS is nationwide and the FPCON is a DOD warning system, HSAS 
should influence the FPCON level.  Or, the FPCON should influence the HSAS because 
the FPCON level covers the US and its assets aboard while HSAS only covers the US.  
Neither seems to be the case.    
The original INFOCON documentation states that the THREATCON, now 
FPCON, may impact the INFOCON level.  Currently, the JTF-CNO doesn’t suggest that 
either the FPCON or the HSAS impact the INFOCON.  This may be because terrorists 
haven’t, as far as we know, yet resorted to cyber terrorism.   
The FPCON and DEFCON systems are both indicators of the world situation.  
The DEFCON levels represent our likelihood of going to war.  This is one system that 
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should influence the INFOCON level, because if war is imminent or occurring our 
information systems should employ greater protective measures in expectation that the 
enemy will be targeting them with any means at their disposal. Though, at DEFCON 1, 
there may be some situations that require no addition protective measures be in place in 
order to accomplish the mission.  The original INFOCON document states that DEFCON 
may impact the INFOCON level. However, the JTF-CNO discourages correlation 
between the DEFCON level and the INFOCON level.  [ST02]   
There is no correlation between any of the governmental warning systems and the 
SANS INFOCON system.   
The intelligence community’s level of concern, which is represented by 
WATCHCON and CNA-WATCHCON systems, seems to be the one warning system that 
has a direct correlation to the INFOCON. Intelligence assessments from the 
WATCHCONs are in the criteria for the INFOCON levels. In fact, the WATCHCONs 
seem to have influence on all of other the warning systems.  This makes sense, because 
all of the warning systems have an intelligence assessment component.     
This relationship among the various threat systems is presented in Figure 6. This 
figure highlights both the comprehensive coverage of the WATCHCON systems, in 
addition to the overlapping, cross-influential relationships among the remaining systems. 
Of particular import to this thesis is the notion that the INFOCON levels are influenced to 
some degree by the Nation’s other governmental threat level systems.   
 
Figure 6.   WATCHCONs influence on other warning systems. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING INFOCON SYSTEM 
Before analyzing the INFOCON System, the four assumptions made by its  
drafters should be presented.  These assumptions are explicitly expressed as such in the 
original INFOCON documentation.  First among these assumptions is the belief that a 
successful intrusion in one network may facilitate access to another network, so it is 
assumed that a risk assumed by one is a risk that may eventually be “shared” by all.  The 
methods employed by increasingly more sophisticated attackers are more problematic to 
detect.  Thus, it is another assumption that the protective measures must be planned, 
exercised, and executed in advance of an attack.  That the anonymous nature of an 
attacker must not hinder the execution of defensive strategies and tactics is another 
assumption.  Similarly; that an incident that could be an attack, system anomaly, or 
operator error, should be characterized as malicious until assessed otherwise is the final 
assumption. [LU01, OF01, RA02] 
There are several places that indications and warning are mentioned in the 
criteria.  These are the indications and warning for Information Operations from the 
CNA-WATCHCON.   CNA intelligence assessments, specific criteria, and procedures 
are classified SECRET or higher, so no further detail about them will be discussed in this 
thesis.. [DE03, RA02] 
The purpose of the INFOCON is to recommend actions that uniformly heighten or 
reduce the DOD defensive posture, to defend against CNA, and to mitigate sustained 
damage to the DOD information infrastructure. There are five INFOCON levels.  The 
range from lowest to highest is Normal through Delta.  Each level has criteria.  Any of 
the level’s criterion can be met to justify elevation to that level.  The criteria for each 
level are broad guidance to consider, not firm rules.  [LU01, OF01, RA02] 
 
A. AUTHORITY  
This system was established by the Secretary of Defense.  Initially, it was 
administered through the Director for Operations, Joint Staff (J-3). It is currently 
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administered by the Commander, Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF-
CND).  The JTF-CNO is the office that is currently tasked with updating/reworking the 
INFOCON system. 
 
B. APPLICABILITY/SCOPE  
The INFOCON system is used throughout the Department of Defense, all over the 
world.  This includes the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and Defense 
agencies.  The INFOCON system applies in both peacetime and war.  All commands and 
support agencies must develop procedures specific to their command/agency in addition 




There are two sets of procedures to consider.  Why the INFOCON level changes is 
in the procedures on how to determine the INFOCON level, and Who can make changes 
to the INFOCON level is in the procedures for declaring the INFOCON level.    
1. Determining the INFOCON  
The INFOCON level is based on significant changes to operational, technical, 
and/or intelligence factors. These factors are further detailed in Section 3-D, the analysis 
of the criteria. The JTF-CNO assimilates and evaluates information to assess the CND 
situation DOD-wide.  Commanders must assess the situation and establish the proper 
INFOCON based on the evaluation of all relevant factors.  [RA02] 
2. Declaring the INFOCON  
The INFOCON is set for the DOD by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).  The 
JTF-CNO recommends the changes through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) to the SecDef, who may further delegate declaration authority to the JTF-CND.  
All commands and agencies may change their organization’s INFOCON level, but they 
must remain at an INFOCON level that is no less than the INFOCON directed by SecDef 




D. ANALYSIS OF EACH INFOCON LEVEL CRITERIA 
1. Normal 
The lowest INFOCON level is Normal and it indicates normal activity.  The only 
criteria for maintaining this level is that there is no significant probability of attack 
against the network.  The existing INFOCON doesn’t require a specific tools or devices 
to secure the network. [LU01, RA02] 
2. Alpha 
The next level, Alpha, indicates an increased probability of attack. The primary 
consideration, per the JTF-CND, is to consider if there is any planned or ongoing military 
operation, contingency or exercise that requires increased security of information 
systems.  The next, item to consider is if whether the CNA intelligence indications and 
warnings (I&W) indicate a general threat.   Any detected network scans, probes, or other 
activities indicating a pattern of surveillance would be the next consideration.   Regional 
events that affect US interests and that involve potential adversaries with suspected or 
known CNA capability would be the final indication to elevate to the Alpha level.   
[LU01, RA02] 
3. Bravo 
The Bravo level indicates a specific probability of attack.  A planned or ongoing 
major military operation or contingency would be the first criteria to consider.  This 
would be followed by any CNA intelligence I&W indicating the specific targeting of 
systems, locations, units, or operations.  The network consideration would be a 
significant level of network probes, scans, or activities detected indicating a pattern of 
concentrated reconnaissance activities.   The final consideration would be any attempted 
network penetration or Denial of Service (DoS) that has no current or expected impact on 
DOD operations.   [LU01, RA02] 
4. Charlie 
The occurrence of limited attacks indicates Charlie level.  There are two main 
criteria.  The intelligence assessment(s) indicating a limited attack is the proactive 
criterion.  The other criterion is the detected attack(s) on information systems with 
limited impact to DOD operations.  Limited impact is defined as minimal success of the 
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attacker and the attack successfully counteracted, little or no data or systems 
compromised, or the unit is able to accomplish its mission.  [LU01, RA02] 
5. Delta 
The highest level, Delta, indicates the occurrence of general attacks.  It has two 
criterion to consider, both of which have to do with the impact of incidents.  The 
detected, successful attack(s) on information systems that impact DOD operations is one 
criterion.  The other is widespread incidents that undermine the ability of the unit to 
function effectively causing a significant risk of mission failure.  [LU01, RA02] 
6. Summary 
At each level there are four considerations to be taken in order of increasing 
significance per the JTF-CNO.  First, any planned or ongoing military operation(s) is the 
criterion with the greatest significance.  Any intelligence I&W is the next consideration 
in significance.  Detected network activities indicating reconnaissance or attack is the 
second lowest item of significance.  Interestingly, the impact of a CNA is the least 
significant criterion, but it is the only criterion for the highest INFOCON level. [LU01, 
RA02] 
These four considerations fall into three broad categories of or factors that 
influence the INFOCON level.  These categories are operational, technical, and 
intelligence.  The intelligence category includes such areas as US CNA intelligence, 
foreign intelligence, and law enforcement intelligence.  Significant changes in one or 
more of the three categories is the basis for the INFOCON level. [LU01, RA02] 
An increase in the probability of an attack is reflected by each level, culminating 
in the Delta level, which requires the occurrence of general attacks.   The probability of 
an attack would be derived from the combination of actual events and expected events.  
Thus, the probability of an attack is one possible, implied method of definition for the 
criteria.  [LU01, RA02] 
The severity of impact of the attack also increases with each level, to the point 
that it is the only criteria for the Delta level. Though the impact is considered the least 
significant criterion, it is still a contributing element to the definition of the INFOCON 
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level criteria. Therefore, another possible, implied method of definition for the criteria is 
the severity of the impact of the threat or attack. [LU01, RA02] 
   The documentation does not give an explicit definition nor is there definitive 
evidence that there is a definition.  The analysis of the INFOCON level criteria revealed 
two possible implied definitions from the vague, generalized criteria, which are the 
severity of the impact of the attack and the probability of an attack. Therefore, in the 
absence of concrete criteria or definitions, the probability of an attack and the severity of 
the impact of an attack are the implied methods of definition selected for the INFOCON 
levels. 
 
E. ANALYSIS OF EACH INFOCON LEVEL’S RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 
The recommended actions include some ‘appropriate’ general security practices, 
which are detailed below.  These very general security practices, which, if implemented 
correctly, can significantly reduce the risk of a successful attack against an information 
system.  Good, solid security practices are the foundation of a sound, prevention-based, 
information assurance program.  The next several paragraphs detail some of the 
conceptual security practices as put forth by the INFOCON guidelines. [RA02] 
System administration, including system security administration, is always critical 
to securing an information system.  Organizations must ensure their systems are 
administered by technically qualified and experienced personnel. These personnel must 
be provided periodic professional training in system administration and security.  All 
system administrators (SAs) and system security administrators (SSAs) require the 
necessary tools to assist them in effective baseline management, auditing, and network 
intrusion detection.  Also, critical to reliable and secure operations are configuration 
management, proper staffing, and strong systems security policies. [RA02] 
SAs should perform regular auditing and log review for suspicious activity.  
Logging and review requirements should increase as the INFOCON level increases.  
These requirements include more frequent reviews, analysis of activity below normal 
trigger thresholds, focused string searches, and the submission of logs to a designated 
organization that conducts specialized reviews. [RA02] 
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Periodic back-ups of files critical to the accomplishment of the mission should be 
conducted by the system administrators.  The storage of the back-ups should be isolated 
from any network, as well as, physically separated from the originating facility.  A rise in 
the INFOCON level may warrant an increase in the frequency of back-ups, but there are 
no guidelines specified. If the INFOCON level increases, back-up frequency may 
increase from quarterly, monthly, or weekly to daily or real-time. [RA02] 
All organizations should establish procedures for conducting internal security 
reviews.  As a minimum, an internal security review should include; searching for default 
and weak passwords, conducting vulnerability scans, identifying network access points 
and their operational importance, raising awareness level of all users of any new 
vulnerabilities that are found, examination of historically dormant or infrequently used 
accounts for signs of unusual activity, and  a review of all pertinent technical advisories.  
Technical advisories include the installation of patches, implementation of fixes, and the 
execution of preventive or mitigating actions. [RA02] 
Procedures should also be established for coordinating external vulnerability 
assessments and analysis of the organization’s information systems. Outside agencies 
such as DISA, NSA, and Service CERTs/CIRTs should conduct the assessments and 
analysis.  Network scans, OPSEC surveys, COMSEC reviews, and red team operations 
may be included is such assessments. [RA02] 
Before implementing a higher action, all actions required at the lower levels must 
be implemented. The appropriate general security practices that were just detailed are 
referred to by the documentation by two descriptions in the recommended actions of the 
INFOCON system. The documentation refers to appropriate response actions and 
appropriate security practices in different levels as recommended actions.  These two 
descriptions seem to entail the same actions, such as increased level of auditing.  This 
thesis will use the appropriate response actions, because appropriate security practices 
implies actions done on a continual basis not as a response to an indicator. There are 
recommended actions for each INFOCON level.  Before implementing a higher action, 
all actions required at the lower levels must be implemented.   
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The recommended actions, unless specifically directed by Secretary of Defense, 
are the response measures associated with the INFOCON levels. The response measures 
must be applied judiciously, otherwise they may result in the needless loss of operational 
capability due to the unnecessary or overzealous application of safeguards. Such 
overwrought reactions might actually contribute to the adversary’s objectives.  Also, the 
response measures directed by combatant commands will take precedence over those 
directed by the Service INFOCONs.  [RA02] 
1. Normal 
The Normal level’s recommended actions are the minimum set of actions for all 
the INFOCON levels.  These actions correspond to those required by any system that has 
been certified and accredited through the DOD Information Technology Security 
Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP). [BU01, DI03, DOD05] 
The actions at this level involve identifying all mission critical information, 
information systems, the information systems’ operational importance, all points of 
access, and operation necessity of those access points.  Employing normal reporting 
procedures, periodically reviewing and testing higher INFOCON levels, and conducting 
all normal security practices on a continuing basis are also recommended actions at this 
level.  Normal security practices include conducting education and training for users, 
administrators, and management, conducting periodic internal security reviews, external 
vulnerability assessments, normal auditing, review of file back-up procedures, installing 
patches for newly identified vulnerabilities, and ensuring that an effective password 
management program is in place.   [DOD04, RA01, RA02]  
2. Alpha 
Alpha’s recommended actions are to execute appropriate response actions, and 
employ normal reporting procedures.  Also, in addition to reviewing and testing the 
higher level INFOCON actions, proactive execution of those levels should be considered.   
Appropriate security practices at this level include increasing the level of auditing, 
reviewing of critical file back-up procedures, conducting internal security reviews on all 
critical systems, executing appropriate defensive tactics, and heightening the awareness 
of all information system users and administrators.  [RA02]  
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3. Bravo 
The Bravo level actions are to ensure increased reporting requirements are met, 
appropriate security practices are executed, as well as to, review, test, and consider 
proactive execution of higher level INFOCON actions.   Appropriate response actions at 
this level include increasing the level of auditing, reviewing critical file back-up 
procedures, conducting immediate internal security review on all critical systems, 
executing appropriate defensive tactics, identifying new vulnerabilities, installing 
patches, and disconnecting unclassified dial-up connections not required for current 
operations. [RA02] 
4. Charlie 
The actions at Charlie level involve executing appropriate response actions, 
ensure increased reporting requirements are met, as well as, review, test, and consider 
proactive execution of higher level INFOCON actions.   Appropriate response actions 
include conducting the maximum level of auditing, reviewing critical file back-up 
procedures, giving consideration to restricting traffic to mission essential communication 
only, reconfiguring information systems to minimize access points and increase security, 
re-routing mission-critical communications through unaffected systems, executing 
appropriate defensive tactics, employing alternative modes of communication, 
disseminating new contact information, and disconnecting all non-mission critical 
networks.    
5. Delta 
At Delta, the recommended actions are to ensure increased reporting requirements 
are met and to execute applicable portions of the continuity of operations plan.   The 
continuity of operations plan should include isolating compromised systems from the rest 
of the network, designating alternate information systems, disseminating new 
communication procedures, executing procedures for ensuring a graceful degradation of 
information systems, implementing procedures for conducting operations manually or in 
"stand-alone" mode, and executing other appropriate defensive tactics. [RA02] 
Appropriate defensive tactics at this level are the possible responses to malicious 
activities.  Such activities may be classified into six categories.  These categories are 
reconnaissance or suspicious activity, unauthorized access, denial of service, data 
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browsing, data corruption, and malicious code.  Careful consideration must be given to 
the potential practical and legal consequences prior to the defensive tactics being 
executed.  The defensive tactics are reactive responses to an assessed network attack.  
[RA02]   
6. Summary 
Network defense should, ideally, be based on advanced warning of a network 
attack occurring.  The response measures should be commensurate with the risk and the 
mission requirements. The recommended actions as detailed above, which are quite 
vague, are increasingly more reactive and less preventive as the INFOCON levels 
escalate.  Though not apparent by the very general recommended actions delineated 
above, it is operationally infeasible for the entire DOD to raise the INFOCON level to 
Bravo or above per the JTF-CND.  [RA02] 
 
F. ANALYSIS OF INFOCON LEVELS TO DETERMINE DEMARCATION 
 METHOD 
Now that the INFOCON levels have at least implied definitions, their demarcation 
if any, must be determined.  There is no explicit demarcation method specified in the 
documentation. The criteria that constitute the “cutoff” between each layer needs to be 
determined, if there is any. The question is: Is there a common “theme” to each layer that 
could be leveraged when choosing the appropriate set of safeguard techniques to apply?  
The analysis below will consider options to determine if there are implied methods of 
demarcation.   
The probability of an attack at the lowest level, Normal, is not significant. The 
next level, Alpha, indicates an increased probability of attack.  Whereas, the Bravo level 
indicates the specific probability of attack, but successful attacks haven’t occurred yet.  
Once limited attacks start to occur, an increase to INFOCON level Charlie is warranted. 
The highest level, Delta, indicates the highest probability of attack because of the actual 
occurrence of general attacks.  [RA01, RA02] 
There are several methods of demarcation that were considered based upon the 
authors experience and education.  The INFOCON system is generalized so that those in 
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authority were not bound to concrete guidelines. Each INFOCON level reflects the 
appropriate information operation measures to be taken based on the risk posed by the 
intentional disruption of DOD systems.  The implied demarcation method is probability 
of an attack because it is based on operational, intelligence, and technical information.  
[NA02] 
This chapter has detailed the INFOCON System.  The criteria used to “set” the 
appropriate level were shown to be very general, and without to any specific threat or 
even category of threat.  The “appropriate security practices” are likewise quite general, 
as were the recommended actions. Because of this, only implied criteria of demarcation 
could be considered and analyzed.  Without an explicit method of demarcation, the 
analysis needed to determine the appropriate proactive safeguard responses for each 



























IV. ANALYSIS OF NETWORK DEFENSE METHODOLOGIES 
The extent of the Nation’s cyber vulnerability will never truly be known, because 
the most costly and damaging attacks are not made public.  This information is generally 
not made public in order to preserve the integrity of public institutions.  The FBI 
Computer Security Institute’s (CSI) Computer Crime and Security Survey in 2001 stated 
that 85 percent of the respondents detected computer security breaches within the last 12 
months.   Their Internet connection was the most frequent, 70 percent, point of attack.  In 
2003, the Computer Crime and Security Survey found that 92 percent of the respondents 
had detected attacks within the last 12 months. Again, the respondents’ Internet 
connections were the point of attack 78 percent of the time.  The Nation’s defense 
networks and computers use many of the same hardware and software as the general 
public.  The military refers to these products as COTS, or Commercial off the Shelf 
products.  Thus, the defense systems are subject to the same attacks as those systems.  A 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report released in 2001, indicated that more than 60 
percent of military computers had been compromised. [BU01, CO02, CSRC01, CSRC03, 
NA01, SANS05, SANS08, SANS10] 
Though the world is at great risk from cyber attacks, there is an extraordinarily 
small amount research on building truly secure systems is being conducted.  Only a tiny 
group of researchers are exploring long-term solutions to this problem.  The Naval 
Postgraduate School Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research (NPS 
CISR) lead by Dr. Cynthia Irvine, is one such group.  [CI02, NA01] 
Unfortunately, because of a lack of widespread knowledge on how to build secure 
computer systems, as well as the lack of economic impetus to build them, other methods 
must be employed to secure our cyber interests.  The INFOCON guidance does not 
explicitly specify a defensive methodology that should be used.  All information 
assurance defensive methodologies must be based on policies that are endorsed by 




A. PERIMETER DEFENSE   
The perimeter defense model uses hardware and/or software to protect a network 
by providing well protected gateways between trusted and un-trusted network domains.  
It provides an “outer ring of protection” for systems in the trusted domain so that they can 
connect to un-trusted domains despite the presence of exploitable vulnerabilities within 
each of the individual systems. It is now common to see ''enclaves" hiding from the 
Internet behind firewalls.  However, these enclaves often have few native/on-board 
defensive measures of their own for self-protection. Most of the commercially available 
operating systems and networks available today only offer weak defensive mechanisms, 
therefore they are vulnerable and difficult to protect.  [CSRC01, DE03, DT01, NA01, 
NA02, SC01] 
 General acceptance of the perimeter defense model occurred because it seemed to 
be easier and less expensive to secure only the gateways rather than the many 
applications and systems that “sit” behind them.  Perimeter defenses can prevent, absorb, 
or detect scans, probes, or malicious attacks, thus reducing the risk to the internal 
network. The major risk of relying solely on a perimeter-style defensive strategy is that a 
single successful penetration could compromise the entire network.  [CSRC01, DE03, 
DT01, FU01, NA01, NA02, SC01] 
Typical perimeter defenses include technologies like routers, firewalls, and 
application proxies.  There are many possible perimeter defense designs.   Factors that 
influence design include the degree of security required and the cost. A firewall is 
effective at controlling external access. It also can indicate the amount and type of hostile 
intention the network is attracting. [DE03, FU01, SC01, ZE01] 
Even though properly configured and maintained perimeter defense mechanisms 
prevent many types of malicious access, they do not provide protection against all outside 
threats.   Through security flaws, adversaries directly attack user computers through 





B. DETECTION METHODOLOGY 
Due to the large number of network security threats, it is not a matter of whether 
malicious activity will occur, but when and where.  The Detection Methodology allows 
for the detection of malicious activity.  Detection mechanisms identify and alert on 
unauthorized activity. The activity can be from an external or internal source. This is 
critical to security for two reasons.  First, if an unauthorized person is accurately detected 
on a network it is possible to stop them before than can do any damage.  Second, even if 
damage is done, it can be detected more quickly and thus facilitate prompt damage 
mitigating actions.  [CSRC02, CSRC06, FU01, IN01, OM01, SANS08, ZD01] 
The most common Detection tool is an Intrusion Detection System or IDS.  IDSs 
can be either hardware- or software-based.  It may detect security violations that can not 
be prevented and documents intrusion attempts to the organization. Two other detection 
tools are Honey Pots and Padded Cell Systems.  Honey Pots are decoy systems that 
attempt to lure a malicious person away from the real (i.e., operational) target network.   
Padded Cell Systems are similar to Honey Pots, but instead of luring the malicious 
person, the malicious person is seamlessly transferred to a decoy system after detection.  
[CSRC02, CSRC06, FU01, IN01, OM01, SANS08] 
The effectiveness of Detection mechanisms is based on detection accuracy and 
performance.  The accuracy of detection is determined by the methodology employed. 
Performance is the mechanism’s ability to reliably inspect all the traffic crossing the 
network.  Most Detection mechanisms have several limitations.  They do not scale well.  
They create a large number of false positives and an incredibly large volume of 
information. The automated systems are not usually effective against sophisticated 
adversaries. Finally, these mechanisms are not well protected from malicious activity 
themselves. [CSRC02, FU01, IN01, OM01, PR01] 
 
C. ENCRYPTION 
Encryption is the process of converting data into a form that is unreadable by 
anyone except the intended recipient.  Encryption mechanisms can secure data on 
systems, as well as data that is in transit between systems or networks. Data integrity, 
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authentication, confidentiality, and authorization mechanisms all employ encryption to 
secure a system or network.   [DI02, FU01, HA01, SE01, SS01] 
Tools that use encryption include Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and digital 
signatures.  A VPN is comprised of two or more remote locations that use encrypted 
tunnels to create a “private” channel over a public network.  Digital signatures use public 
key encryption techniques to ensure that a document is authentic and has not been 
modified.  [FU01, HA01, SE01, SS01, WA01] 
Encryption frequently impacts performance because of the time needed to encrypt 
and decrypt the data.  Key management can be the weakness of encryption, because users 
are unwilling or unable to manage encryption keys in a secure, diligent manner.  
Encryption is an excellent defensive methodology, but it is not an end-all solution to 
security.  [DA01, FU01, HA01, SE01] 
 
D. PHYSICAL SECURITY 
Not everyone considers physical security as a network defense methodology.  
However, unauthorized physical access to facilities defeats most of the more technical 
security measures of systems and networks.  Therefore, it must be a primary network 
defense methodology.  Physical security restricts physical access to information 
resources.  It can be as simple as a locked door and as complex as money and technology 
will allow. [CL01, FU01, SANS06, SANS11] 
 
E. DEFENSE IN DEPTH METHODOLOGY 
The DOD leads the way in defining the Defense in Depth (DID) methodology to 
achieve network security in an untrusted environment.  This methodology can be applied 
to any information system or network.   The DID methodology integrates people, 
operations, and technology to establish multiple layers and dimensions of defense 
mechanisms across an information infrastructure.  Multiple layers help to ensure that 
vulnerabilities in one layer will be covered by the other layers.  Each layer and its 
associated technologies complement the protection provided by the other layers and 
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technologies.  Thus, DID is essentially a combination of all of the methodologies 
previously discussed, in addition to lesser defense tools/concepts/implementations that 
are not major “methodologies”, but nonetheless can contribute to the DID strategy. A key 
point to DID is that it employs multiple tools of the same type, such as more than one 
IDS; and more than one technology, such as the application of filtering in addition to an 
IDS. [AS01, CN01, CSRC01, FU01, HA01, NA02, NA04, NE01, NE02, SANS04, 
SANS07, SANS09, SY02] 
There are many possible tools that can be used in a DID protection strategy.  The 
DMZ is one tool that hasn’t been previously discussed.  It is the perimeter network 
segment that is logically between internal and external networks that is also known as a 
screened subnet. It provides un-trusted, external subjects with restricted access to specific 
applications and services.  [AS01, CN01, FU01, HA01, NA02, NE01, NE02, SANS07] 
 
 
Figure 7.   Illustration of DID with DMZ. 
 
Mechanisms employed to provide DID allow one type of protection to fail 
without compromising the entire defensive infrastructure. This assumes the different 
mechanisms of defense do not share vulnerabilities.  Because of the variety and number 
of attack methods and attackers, the DID methodology reduces the risk of successful 
attacks by employing many methods of defense each addressing different kinds of attacks 
and attackers. [AS01, FU01, HA01, NA02, NA04, NE01, SANS04, SANS07] 
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F. SUMMARY 
Information assurance can not be accomplished by a single security mechanism or 
technology.   The methodology that gives the greatest coverage and reduction in risk is 
the Defense in Depth methodology.  [FU01, HA01, HA02] 
Of all of the methodologies presented, none have a pre-defined directed approach 
to their design or implementation.  All of the methodologies are ad-hoc and conducive to 
escalation, but none have any formal escalation process.  Some of the mechanisms 
presented are conducive to a predefined escalation process.  This process could be 
another dimension in the DID methodology, by incrementally increasing the defensive 
technologies. A predefined escalation process would enhance the ability of the DOD to 











There is only one goal of the INFOCON system.  It is to protect DOD systems 
while still supporting accomplishment of the systems’ mission. A subordinate goal is to 
coordinate the overall defensive effort of the DOD through adherence to standards.  
These goals will not be realized if the system is inadequate, over reactive, or difficult to 
use. In support of these goals the DOD instituted the directive for the DOD Information 
Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process or DITSCAP.  This 
directive and those that implement it, require all DOD systems to be certified and have 
established a baseline level of IA. The existing INFOCON has no correlation or 
integration with the DITSCAP. [BU01, DOD03, DOD05, DOD06, RA02] 
The existing INFOCON system was written by policy makers, not by technical 
people.  The ambiguity of the criteria of each level and the reactive nature of the 
recommended actions are the result.  The previous chapter was a detailed analysis of that 
system.  This chapter will detail the evolution of the INFOCON system using a technical 
perspective.  In addition to the existing INFOCON goals, the recommended system will 
endeavor to seamlessly integrate itself into DOD IA community procedures.  
 
A. LEVELS 
There are many things to be taken into consideration when creating a warning 
system.  The primary consideration is for whom the warning system is being developed.   
Since the goal of the INFOCON system is to protect DOD systems, this warning system 
is designed for use by those whose jobs are to do just that.     
1. Demarcation Method 
The demarcation method is based on limiting the external exposure of the 
information infrastructure. This will be done by basing the exposure on the Mission 
Assurance Categories (MAC) from the DITSCAP.   The MAC represents the amount of 
integrity and availability required for a system and has three levels.  MAC III is the 
lowest level and it covers systems that handle day to day business, but don’t materially 
affect support of forces in the short term.  It requires only basic integrity and 
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availability.13  Systems that are important to support forces are covered by MAC II, 
which requires high integrity and medium availability.  The highest level, MAC I, covers 
systems that are vital to the operational readiness or mission effectiveness of the forces 
both in terms of content and timeliness.  It requires both high integrity and high 
availability.  [BU01, DOD03, DOD05, DOD06] 
2. Number of Levels 
The logical demarcation of the levels would be the primary determination of the 
number of levels.  A secondary influence is the granularity that would provide the most 
efficient management.  If there are too many levels the system administrators will be 
overwhelmed.  Too few levels will result in insufficient granularity to address the threat 
or subsequent risk.    For these reasons, the number of levels selected is four.  The lowest 
level actually encompasses the two lowest levels of the existing INFOCON.   
3. Description 
The description of a level could be by color, by name, or by some well-known, 
pre-ordered sequence (e.g., the Greek alphabet: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, etc.) or any 
combination of these. Using names that are borrowed from an ordered sequence is 
naturally intuitive to remember; and the additional association of a color with each name 
accommodates easy visual recognition in certain environments.   
For the four levels chosen there will be a descriptive name and a color.  The color 
will allow quick, visual confirmation with other warning systems.  The names are based 
upon limiting the exposure of the systems that accomplish the mission. These are shown 
in Figure 8.   
                                                 




Figure 8.   INFOCON Levels 
 
All of the DOD networks are required to use the DID methodology.  Therefore it 
is an assumption that all networks using the INFOCON will be fully hardened using the 
DID methodology.  The Normal level represents the norm in which all systems can 
conduct business.  The restriction of access to MAC III systems, which would be the 
necessary non-mission critical systems, is the Necessary level.  The consequences of the 
loss of availability and integrity can be tolerated or overcome.  The Critical level 
represents the restriction of access to, but not complete isolation of, MAC II systems, 
which are mission critical systems that are important to support forces, and the complete 
blockage of MAC III systems.   The critical consequences of the loss of integrity are 
unacceptable and the loss of availability can only be tolerated for a short time. The 
restriction of access to MAC I systems and the complete blockage of all other systems is 
the Grave level. The grave consequences of the loss of integrity or availability are 
unacceptable.  By limiting the exposure of systems in an incremental manner, each level 
makes the network more secure.  [BU01, DOD03, DOD05, DOD06] 
4. Criteria  
As with the existing INFOCON system, a sufficient increase in threat level will 
warrant an increase to a corresponding protection level in this chapter’s new 
recommended INFOCON level.  There will be two categories of criteria in this newly 
proposed INFOCON system.  One category will define the criteria used by the JTF-CNO 
to select the appropriate INFOCON level for the entire DOD.The other will be for all of 
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the entities under the DOD, which will be referred to from this point on as components.  
This separation will give DOD components a more standardized set of criteria and 
processes to follow.  It will also allow the JTF-CNO to know how the components will 
respond.  Both categories of criteria will be directly influenced by the SANS INFOCON, 
FPCON, DEFCON, WATCHCON, and CNA-WATCHCON warning systems. 
[SANS00] 
a) JTF-CNO DOD Criteria  
  The JTF-CNO DOD criteria will be based upon the correlation of 
indicators from warning systems, reports from the commands, and the risk to the overall 
system.  This correlation will be understandably subjective because of the nature of the 
stored information, the massive size and complexity of the network, and the impact to the 
DOD’s ability to complete its mission.   
 By correlating the indicators from the other warning systems, it 
will give the JTF-CNO the ability to take into account threat indications from other 
arenas, such as intelligence and technical.   The SANS INFOCON addresses the threats 
of malicious network activity and loss of connectivity, which affects the DOD just like 
everyone else.  Correlating the FPCON addresses the terrorist threat to information 
systems and the Internet infrastructure.  The DEFCON addresses the threats to military 
operations, which may require the information infrastructure to keep our war-fighters 
safe.  The WATCHCON and the CNA-WATCHON address not only the state sponsored 
hacker threat, but also the rogue political group threat to the information systems. 
  Threat and incident reports from individual DOD components will 
also be correlated.  These reports will indicate the overall condition of the DOD 
information infrastructure.  Other reports contributing to the overall threat picture will 
contain information regarding planned and ongoing military operations; thus 
incorporating additional aspects pertaining to the condition and demands on the 
information infrastructure. 
  Finally, the risk to the DOD information infrastructure will be 
assessed. This criterion will actually be a composite of all of the other criteria and any 
additional information not addressed here.  The risk to the information infrastructure 
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must be weighed against the need to accomplish the mission.  This is an extremely 
difficult and subjective criterion, because of those concerns. 
b) Component Criteria  
   Components will have their own sets of indicators, and their 
responses to these, within the general DOD framework. The component criteria will be 
based upon indicators from warning systems, operations planned or ongoing, technical 
indicators, and the risk to their systems. The operations planned or ongoing for each 
component will be different and thus only addressable by that component.  The risk is 
unique to each component, because each component’s information will be valued 
differently and their systems make up may be different. Therefore, each component will 
address these criteria differently. 
  By correlating the indicators from the other warning systems, each 
of the recommended INFOCON levels will have a corresponding “threat”. The SANS 
INFOCON would map level to level, thereby addressing the threats of malicious network 
activity and loss of connectivity.  The other warning systems each have five levels, so the 
first two levels of each of those systems will correspond to the lowest INFOCON level. 
  Mapping the FPCON levels to the INFOCON levels addresses the 
terrorist threat to information systems.  The DEFCON represents the major military 
operations planned or ongoing, and so it addresses the threats to those operations, as 
would the WATCHCON.  The CNA-WATCHON addresses not only the state sponsored 
hacker threat, but also the rogue political group threat to the information systems. 
  The technical indicators address the hacker/network threat.  Some 
of the technical indicators will also be contained within the SANS INFOCON.  Network 
surveillance activities (i.e., scanning and mapping) are the technical indicators for the 
level Normal.  The technical indicators for the Necessary level are network probes or 
activities indicating concentrated, intrusive, reconnaissance activities (i.e., network 
enumeration).  A network attack, whether it is successful or not, is the technical indicator 
for the Critical INFOCON level. The technical indicator for the Grave level is a 
successful network attack that attempts to gain access to trusted systems (i.e., pilfering).  
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5. Roles and Responsibilities  
The JTF-CNO will coordinate and assess all incoming reports.  It will correlate 
indications from the JTF-CNO DOD criteria and decide the state of the DOD information 
infrastructure.  The JTF-CNO will be responsible for dispersing information to the 
components via the INFOCON level. 
SAs and SSAs will be responsible for gathering technical indicators and the 
warning system levels.  These would include the DOD INFOCON level, the SANS 
INFOCON level, the DOD FPCON level, the DEFCON level, and, if possible, the 
WATCHCON and CNA-WATCHCON levels.  This information, along with the 
recommendation of the SA or SSA for the command’s INFOCON, will be presented to 
the Commanding Officer. 
Commanding Officers, COs, are the final authority on their command’s 
INFOCON level.  They must be able to understand the information and recommendations 
presented by the SAs/SSAs.  The COs must correlate it with knowledge of their 
commands’ mission, and any other information relevant to the situation. (i.e., a classified 
WATCHCON in effect). 
 
B. SAFEGUARD MEASURES 
The safeguard measures are in addition to sound general security practices, such 
as those detailed by the NSA.14  The safeguard measures, as part of a DID 
implementation, will protect DOD systems and networks.  It is assumed that all DOD 
components employ the DID methodology.  Though it is still a draft, it is also assumed 
that the Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM) DOD instruction is being 
applied.  The details of what ports and protocols to block for PPSM are classified.  The 
guiding principle of denying all access except that necessary to conduct official 
“command” business must be followed.  [DOD08] 
                                                 
14 Please see http://www.issa-utah.org/pdf/sd-7.pdf  (February 2004) for “The 60 Minute Network 
Security Guide” 
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Application of the least privilege principle in this manner is known as Deny by 
Default, and is the primary perimeter defense strategy.  The perimeter is the principal 
method of limiting exposure and is the boundary between a component’s network and all 
other outside networks to which it may be connected. At the Normal level this boundary 
has gates that are open to allow commerce and communication to flow freely.  The 
boundary stiffens and the gates limit the traffic between the component and the Internet at 
the Necessary level.  At the Critical level, the gates limit the traffic to only that to and 
from the mil domain.  Since this recommended INFOCON behavior is for the DOD 
alone, this is a feasible strategy. All traffic be must pass the gates via an encrypted tunnel 
at the Grave level. 
However, the component at the other end of the tunnel may not be at the same 
INFOCON level and therefore not be following the same policies and procedures.   If that 
component is at a lower INFOCON level, this may expose the higher INFOCON level 
component.  Unfortunately, if each component necessarily raised itself to the highest 
level of any other component it communicated with, there would be a cascade effect that, 
given sufficient time and communication, could eventually encompass the entire DOD. 
So this exposure is inescapable because it is not feasible to make the entire DOD respond 
to such an event. 
Most of the existing INFOCON recommended actions are general policies in the 
DOD.  These are still pertinent and can be found in Appendix F.   [RA02] 
The suggested safeguard measures are technical actions and are detailed in Table 
1.  The measures take into account that communication within the DOD must always be 
available.  The myriad of possible network topologies and DID implementations make it 
impossible to create a fixed set of safeguard measures that are appropriate for in every 
instance.  Instead, the safeguard measures elaborated upon here will be for a prototypical 
network and the commonly supported network services found on it. It is also assumed 




Area/Tools Normal Necessary Critical Grave 
Perimeter         
All Install latest patches, 
Updates 
      
Gateway 
Router 
Deny by Default Deny by Default; 
Allow port 80 
Deny by Default; 
Allow port 80 
Block all ports 
except VPN 
  
Don't allow untrusted 
addresses to port 53  
      
  
Disable any unused 
interfaces and mgmt ports 
      
  
Block certain ICMP (allow 
obd Echo)(allow inbd Echo 
Reply, Dest Unreachable) 
Block all ICMP     
  Block inbound traceroute       
  
Log each stmt blocked by 
filters       
  
Logging is at lowest level.  
(Cisco=Errors) Logs sent to 
SysLog server.  
Set logging to 
one level below 
medium. 
(Cisco=Warnings) 
Set logging to 




serious level of 





Block inbound IPs from 
protected network, local 
host, or multicast addresses 
      
  
Block outbound IPS that 
have external IP as source 
IP, Block packets with same 
src/dest. IP and port. 
      
  
Restrict access to small set 
of computers telnet access 
to internal interfaces. Log all 
connections. 
Disallow telnet 
access to the 
router. 
    
  
Restrict access to small set 
of computers SSH access 
only. Log all connections 
  Disallow external 




Sample two reliable NTP 
servers for time 
      
  
Set all log messages to the 
same IP source address of 
an internal network interface 
      
Firewall Deny by Default Deny by 
Default;Allow port 
80 
Deny by Default; 
Allow port 80 
Block all ports 
except VPN 
  
Log each stmt blocked by 
filters 
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Logging is at lowest level.  
(Cisco=Errors) Logs sent to 
SysLog server.  
Set logging to 
one level below 
medium. 
(Cisco=Warnings) 
Set logging to 




serious level of 




Mgd Switch Deny by Default Deny by Default; 
Allow port 80 
Deny by Default; 
Allow port 80 
Block all ports 
except VPN 
  Deny Voice over IP       
  Isolate critical systems on 
their own vlan 
    Restrict access to 
critical vlans 
  Logging is at lowest level.  
(Cisco=Errors) Logs sent to 
SysLog server.  
Set logging to 
one level below 
medium. 
(Cisco=Warnings) 
Set logging to 




serious level of 





Log each stmt blocked by 
filters 
    Log all traffic to 
critical vlans 
  
Password protect all 
interfaces and mgmt ports 
      
  
Sample two reliable NTP 
servers for time 
      
Detection         
All Install latest patches, 
Updates 
      





Externally Port Scan 
network daily 
Externally Confirm 
VPN, NTP ports 
visible 
Pwd Cracker Run 2/month Run weekly Run daily   
Syslog Disable unnecessary 
servers and accounts on log 
host. 
      
  
Audit weekly send Email alerts 
to SA; Audit 
2/week 
Audit logs daily Audit logs twice a 
day 
IDS Monitor TCP/IP, UDP traffic 
from gateway rtr; 
Monitor all traffic 
gateway rtr 




Enable the fastest alert 
mode 
Enable the full 
alert mode 
    
Virus 
Scanners 
Run daily on all computers   Run 2/day   
Services         
All Install latest patches, 
Updates 




      
  
Each service is on a 
dedicated host. 
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Web Remove all unnecessary 
services on web server host 
Block access to 
Internet Mail 
Put up static content 
web site 
Stop web service 
  
Isolate the web server 
physically and virtually 
      
  
Separate content into 
separate directories 




Make all content 




Enable web site logging. 
Audit weekly. 
Audit daily     
  








Remove all samples 
installed 
      
FTP Only allow if necessary for 







Disallow writes to 
public directories via 
FTP 
Stop FTP Service 
SNMP Don't use std community 
strings, restrict access to 
SNMP server 
Allow read only 
access.  
 Log all access. Disable all SNMP 
servers 
DNS Disable the BIND name 
daemon on non-DNS 
servers. 
      
  
Enable logging. Audit 
weekly 
Audit 2/week Audit daily   
DHCP Enable logging. Audit 
weekly 
Audit 2/week Audit daily   
PDC / Active 
Directory 
Log all unsuccessful login 
attempts; Log every action 
by root account. 







    
Printers Block all external access       
Dial in 
access 
Authenticate using network 
login 
Restrict access to 
auth numbers 
Block access   
  
Number isn't in the grouping 
of the org 
      
  Don't publish the number       
Applications         
All Install latest patches, 
Updates 
      
  










Email Don't open attachments 
unless trusted source 
Encrypt all email 
to non .gov and 
.mil sites.  
Allow email to and 
from .mil only and 
require digital 
signatures 
Encrypted email to 
.mil only 
  
Block .bas, .bat, .chm, .com, 
.cpl, .crt, .exe, .hta, .inf, .ins, 
.isp, .js, .jse, .lnk, .msi, 
.msp, .mst, .pif, .pl, .reg, 
.scr, .sct, .shs, .url, .vb, 






attachments.   
  
FTP Disable unless necessary Disable external 
access 
Disable   
TELNET Disable external access.  
Disable internal use unless 
necessary 
Disable      
r cmds Disable external access.  




Disable   
SSH   External allowed 
to gov't & mil 
sites 








Disable   
  Decode alias isn't available       
VPN Available for telecommuting   Restrict external 
VPN access 
Only access 
allowed through the 
perimeter 
Backup Complete backup weekly, 
incremental or differential 










Databases Disable external access 
unless necessary 
  Restrict external 
access to critical 
databases 




Enable logging. Audit 
weekly 
Audit 2/week Audit daily   




The evolution of the INFOCON is based upon the analysis of the existing 
INFOCON, policies and goals of the DOD, and a desire to detail a system that is useful 
and standardized.  The suggested INFOCON has four levels that are demarcated by the 
amount of exposure of its systems based upon the mission assurance categories of the 
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DITSCAP.  It has two categories of criteria to determine the INFOCON level, one to be 
used by the JTF-CNO to determine the DOD INFOCON level and the other to be used by 
the DOD components.  This allows standardization of the criteria for the DOD 
components. It also lessens the subjectivity of the decision process by giving guidance on 
technical threats and direct correlation of the other warning systems.   
The suggested INFOCON protects the DOD information infrastructure by 
employing proactive and preventive actions that can incrementally increase its security 
posture, while still allowing for mission accomplishment.  By not focusing on the 
potential or existing threats and instead focusing on a proactive defense-in-depth 
protection strategy, the suggested INFOCON attempts to lessen risk by greatly reducing 
the exposure of vulnerable systems.  This also makes the information infrastructure more 
secure against both known and unknown threats.   
  Each area of defense has devices or services associated with it.  These can be 
used to counter certain explicit and implicit threats for each of the suggested INFOCON 
levels.  Some of these devices/services are good candidates for implementing predefined 
security escalation scripts.  These candidates must also meet other considerations before 
they can be selected as the prototype devices/services to run the predefined security 
escalation scripts. 
A primary consideration for such devices and services is the ability to manage 
that device or service from one location using a script.  This would allow one SA or SSA 
to securely escalate the security of the entire network from one location.  The use of a 
simple command line interface to run the escalation scripts is more secure and would not 
require the certification and accreditation that a GUI interface would require.  
Another consideration is the security relevancy of the device or service to the 
security of the network.  The service or device should be a key part of the security of the 
network.   
A third consideration is the probability that the device or service is included in 
most DOD networks.  The make, model, or version of the device or service is not part of 
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this consideration.  Just that the general category of device or service, such as a gateway 
router, should be included in most DOD networks. 
Two devices and a service that are likely to be in most DOD networks are a 
gateway router, a managed switch, and a Syslog server.  Devices such as a gateway router 
and managed switches could have security escalation scripts written for them that could 
be invoked from a single/central security administrator’s machine.  Syslog is a service 
that the devices report to.  The information that is sent to the Syslog server can be 
escalated. So the escalation for the Syslog server is the escalation in the 
volume/granularity of information it collects.   
A gateway router is the first device or tool on a network that can filter and 
re-route data, so it is very relevant to the security of the network.  Managed 
switches also filter and re-route data, but they can also isolate segments of the 
network, which is network security relevant.  The Syslog server is the central 
collection point for security relevant events received from routing/switching 
devices, other detection tools, and various potential target services on the 
protected network.   
Each of these mechanisms protects against different types of threats.  They also 
meet the three considerations discussed.  For these reasons, a gateway router, a managed 
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VI. SAFEGUARD MEASURES SCRIPTS 
By focusing on a defense in depth proactive protection strategy, the suggested 
INFOCON protects the DOD information infrastructure by proactive and preventive 
techniques that enable the accomplishment of the mission.  Some of the devices and tools 
employed in this strategy are good candidates for implementing predefined security 
escalation scripts.  A gateway router, a managed switch, and a Syslog server were 
selected as the prototype devices and tool to run these escalation scripts to demonstrate 
these concepts.   
This chapter will detail the design considerations, the structure of the scripts, the 
scripts themselves, and the devices and tool utilized.   The network, on which the 
prototype scripts will be run, will be described, as well as the considerations of that 
network.   Finally, generalizations derived from this prototype will be presented. 
 
A. SCRIPT CONSIDERATIONS 
There were several considerations used in regards to the design, development, and 
implementation of the escalation scripts.  The first consideration was whether to manage 
the device scripts in a distributed manner or to centrally manage the scripts.  The device 
scripts would be called by a single, main script that would be located on the 
administrator’s machine.  
 It is easier to maintain and update scripts when they are in one location rather 
than spread across an entire network.  However, if that location becomes compromised 
than all of those scripts are suspect. That may mean the perimeter has already been 
breached and the scripts suspect any way.15  It is common for SAs of large networks to 
push changes for large number of routers using centralized scripts.  So, for our example, 
it was determined that the scripts would be managed centrally. 
The next consideration was focused on the gateway router and the managed 
switch.  Should there be a single configuration file located on the device that contains all 
of access control lists (ACLs), which function as filters and self protection mechanisms, 
                                                 
15 A insider would not be considered to have breached the perimeter security. 
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for every level of the suggested INFOCON and the script only changes the ACL for each 
interface?  Or should there be a configuration file for each INFOCON level that the script 
loads into the device? 
It is faster to just change the ACL for each interface, but then the configuration 
files must be kept on the device and in another location for documentation.  Managing the 
configuration files in a central location doesn’t require the configuration files be kept in 
two places, it does require that the entire configuration file be transferred to change the 
level on the device.  Maintaining two copies of the same document presents the difficulty 
of keeping those documents synchronized.  Nothing is more frustrating and dangerous 
than believing that the device is using one configuration file, when it actually has another. 
Thus, the configuration files and the escalation scripts should be centrally managed. 
 
B. PROTOTYPE NETWORK 
Originally, the devices and tool to be prototyped were part of an existing, suitable 
network in a laboratory environment.  However, because of the unexpected rapid 
development of this network into a bastion network an alternative had to be improvised.  
A small network was created for the sole purpose of developing and testing the 
predefined escalation scripts.   
This small network consists of a Cisco 2600 Router, Cisco 2590 Managed Switch, 
a server, a user machine, and an administrative machine.  The server is both the TFTP 
server and the Syslog server. Unfortunately, the gateway router for this network does not 
support SSH... 
This will require the use of telnet to manage the scripts, which is less secure 
because it transmits the passwords in the clear.  The safeguard measures recommends the 
use of SSH instead of telnet for that reason.  The configuration files have been modified 





Figure 9.   Prototype Network Diagram 
 
C. SCRIPTS 
Each of the mechanisms selected protect against different threats.  The gateway 
router is the primary perimeter defense mechanism that will mitigate the threat of most 
amateur attackers, known as Script Kiddies.  The managed switch is a second layer 
perimeter defense mechanism that mitigates the better Script Kiddies, the insider threat, 
and allows isolation of critical systems.  Syslog is a detection mechanism that will help 
protect against the insider threat, external threats, and mitigate successful intrusions by 
the analysis of the events contained within its logs.  [FI01, KO01, RO01, ST01] 
Each mechanism’s particular mitigating actions will be initiated by the command 
line escalation scripts.  The purpose of the scripts is to allow a single SA or SSA to 
securely manage the security of the entire network from one location.  These scripts are 
proof of concepts to be viewed as examples.  [FI01, KO01, RO01, ST01] 
There are three scripts, respectively called infocon, router, and switch.  All of the 
scripts are located on one machine, the SA or SSA computer, and in the same directory.  
The main script, called infocon, was conceived so that the “push a single button concept” 
could be accomplished.  It is the controlling script.  It calls the router script and then the 




Figure 10.   Flow diagram of prototype scripts 
 
1. Infocon 
This script, which is takes the INFOCON level as an argument, calls the device 
escalation scripts and passes the INFOCON level to the device escalation scripts.  So 
with the command ‘./infocon grave’, the gateway router and the managed switch are 




echo "updating router" 
./router $level | telnet 
# 
echo " " 
sleep 1 
echo "updating switch" 
# 
./switch $level | telnet 
sleep 1 
# 
#echo "updating webserver" 
./webserver $level | telnet 
sleep 1 
echo "updating complete" 
#end 
[FI01, KO01, RO01, ST01] 
 
2. Gateway Router 
The managed switch was an old Cisco 2600.  The particular mitigating actions to 
be taken by a gateway router are described in Table 1 under Gateway Router.  The actual 
configuration files for each INFOCON level are included in Appendix H.  The gateway 
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router script also takes the INFOCON level as an argument and is piped to telnet.  The 
command ‘./router normal | telnet necessary’ escalates the gateway router to the second 
lowest level of security.  Even though the configuration files are “copied” into the 
startup-config and the running-config files, it is not a true copy.  The Cisco operating 
system for the router actually merges two files, when one is copied over the other.  For 
this reason, to eliminate the Access Control Lists (ACLs) a configuration file without any 
ACLs, noACLs.txt, must be copied over the startup-config and the running-config files 
first. 
 The script is as follows: 















































[FI01, KO01, RO01, ST01] 
3. Managed Switch 
The managed switch was a new Cisco Catalyst 2590.  The particular mitigating 
actions to be taken by a managed switch are described in Table 1 under Managed Switch.  
This switch has the ability to use access lists to authenticate ports. Not all ports will have 
this ability. The actual configuration files for each INFOCON level are included in 
Appendix I.  The managed switch script also takes the INFOCON level as an argument 
and is piped to telnet.  The command ‘./switch normal | telnet normal’ sets the managed 
switch to the lowest level of security.   
The script is as follows: 

































[FI01, KO01, RO01, ST01] 
 
4. Syslog 
There are no configuration files for the Syslog server, because its purpose is to 
receive the logs sent to it by other network devices.  It is the central repository for all 
event logs.  By having all devices log to the same location, this makes it easier for the SA 
or SSA to analyze the event logs and detect a breach in the network or an insider.   
 
D. SUMMARY 
A small network consisting of a Cisco 2600 Router, Cisco 2590 Managed Switch, 
a TFTP server, a Syslog server, a user machine, and an administrative machine was 
created for the development, testing, and implementation of the predefined escalation 
scripts.   The router does not support SSH, so the configuration files were modified 
appropriately.   
There were two considerations in the design of the scripts that were addressed.  
First, the predefined escalation scripts would be managed centrally, locating them on the 
administrator’s machine.  Secondly, the configuration files would be managed centrally 
on the TFTP server.  This allows the maximum ease of documentation and maintenance. 
The predefined escalation scripts were designed, developed, tested, and 
successfully implemented.  These scripts allow the suggested INFOCON to protect the 
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DOD information infrastructure by employing proactive and preventive techniques in a 
standardized manner.  This standardization is part of the foundation that allows the DOD 
and its components to accomplish their mission. 
The successful escalation prototype concept can be applied to other components 
in the network.  An Apache Web server, which is an application, was included in the 
prototype network to demonstrate that concept.  Its script is detailed in Appendix G.  The 
script primarily alters the level of logging that the web server sends to the Syslog server. 
Most applications, devices, and tools have logging capabilities.  So, the safeguard 
measures regarding logging for the router could be applied to all applications, devices, 
and tools on the network.  This is an example of how to apply the escalation prototype 






























In summary, this body of work has presented the INFOCON and the foundation 
of its evolution.  The warning systems that influence the INFOCON were discussed.  The 
analysis of the INFOCON followed.  
This analysis answered several thesis questions. How are the INFOCON levels 
defined? The INFOCON levels are not explicitly defined.  The probability of an attack 
and the severity of the impact of an attack are the implied methods of definition for the 
INFOCON levels that were selected.  These definitions lead into the next question.  How 
are the INFOCON levels demarcated? The method of demarcation of the INFOCON 
levels is the risk posed to DOD information systems.  There was not a “cutoff” criterion 
between the layers.  Nor was there a common “theme” that could be leveraged when 
choosing the safeguard measures to be applied. 
The analysis of the network defense methodologies answered several more 
questions. What is the current landscape of network defense methodologies?  It revealed 
that all of the methodologies were ad-hoc and conducive to escalation, but none had any 
formal escalation process.   
Some of the mechanisms presented were conducive to a predefined escalation 
process. These same mechanisms could accommodate a semi-automated predefined 
escalation process.  This would enhance the ability of the DOD to attain the goals of the 
INFOCON system.  
The suggested INFOCON system is an information warning system whose goal is 
to protect DOD systems while still supporting accomplishment of the mission.  Limiting 
the exposure of systems that support the mission is the stated method of demarcation for 
its four levels.  Its base level, Normal, represents a fully hardened information 
infrastructure whose defense is based on the DID methodology and is conducting normal 
day to day operations.   The next level, Necessary, limits the exposure of the MAC III 
systems and should be maintainable indefinitely.  Critical, which is the third level, limits  
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the exposure of MAC II systems and should be maintainable for a reasonable duration. 
Finally, Grave limits the exposure of MAC I systems and should only be maintained for 
the minimum possible time.  
The criteria have been separated into two categories to facilitate the 
standardization of determining the INFOCON level.   The direct correlation of other 
warning systems to each INFOCON level and the technical indicators at the component 
level are the two criteria that are not subjective.  All of the criteria for the JTF-CNO are 
subjective due to the size, complexity, and nature of the DOD information infrastructure. 
The suggested INFOCON protects the DOD information infrastructure by 
proactive techniques that enable the accomplishment of the mission.  By focusing on a 
strong proactive defense in depth strategy, the suggested INFOCON incrementally 
lessens the exposure of the systems thereby making the information infrastructure more 
secure against known and future threats.  This answers the question; What is the 
appropriate tactical response to each of the INFOCON levels? 
The ability to secure the information infrastructure against known and future 
threats is one of the suggested INFOCON system’s greatest benefits.  It also offers the 
users of the system a system designed from their perspective, thus allowing greater user 
acceptance and understanding, which are both key to the success of any warning system.  
The suggested safeguard measures are specific, technical, and feasible, which removes 
ambiguity and replaces it standardization.    
In Table 1, each area of defense has devices associated with it that mitigate 
implied or expected threats for each of the suggested INFOCON levels.  Some of the 
devices mentioned in the safeguard measures are good candidates for implementing 
predefined security escalation scripts.  Thus, another thesis question could be answered:  
What security-implementing devices would make good candidates for implementing the 
security scripts?  Devices such as the gateway router, the managed switch, and a Syslog 
server are good candidates to receive escalation scripts that could be run from one 
machine. These devices were selected as the prototype devices. 
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Can the safeguard scripts be centrally managed?  This was a question that needed 
to be answered before the design and development of the predefined escalation scripts.  It 
is less complicated and faster to push changes for a large number of network components 
using centralized scripts.  So, it was determined that the configuration files and the 
escalation scripts could be centrally managed.   
The suggested INFOCON is quite feasible technically, as demonstrated by the 
simplicity of the prototype scripts. The existing INFOCON system is currently being re-
engineered by the JTF-CNO and the suggested INFOCON system could be an option for 




The goal of the INFOCON system is to protect DOD systems while still 
supporting accomplishment of the mission. The suggested INFOCON system 
accomplishes that goal because it is based upon supporting the mission.  It also 
accomplishes the goal of coordinating the overall defensive effort of the DOD through 
adherence to criteria and demarcation standards provided by the Mission Assurance 
Categories. 
 
B. FUTURE WORK 
There are several areas for future work, research, and development.  Here are just 
a few: 
• Working with the JTF-CNO to develop the next INFOCON system. 
• In depth analytical assessment of the relationship among the numerous 
warning systems. 
• Analysis and development of reporting procedure to better integrate the 
existing warning systems. 
• Development of real-time automated log auditing. 
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• Development of a sound technique of auditing logs to reveal insider threats. 
• Feasibility study of integrating the INFOCON into the DITSCAP. 
• Formal mathematical analysis (Ph.D. level research) of the demarcation of the 
INFOCON levels. 
• Development of an efficient event reporting procedure between JTF-CNO and 










APPENDIX A – ACRONYMS 
ACL………..Access Control List 
ARPANET…Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 
CJCS……….Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CNA………..Computer Network Attack 
CNA WATCHCON…. Computer Network Attack Watch Condition 
COTS………Commercial off the Shelf 
DEFCON…. Defense Readiness Condition 
DID…………Defense in Depth 
DII………….DOD information infrastructure  
DITSCAP….DOD Information Technology Security Certification & 
Accreditation Process 
DOD………..Department of Defense 
DoS………...Denial of Service 
EMP………..Electromagnetic pulse  
FPCON……Force Protection Condition 
GAO………General Accounting Office 
HSAS……...Homeland Security Advisory System 
I&W……….Indications and Warning 
IDS………...Intrusion Detection System 
INFOCON...Information Operations Condition 
IA………….Information Assurance 
IP…………. Internet Protocol 
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IPsec………Internet Protocol Security 
IS………….Information System 
JTF-CND…Joint Task Force, Computer Network Defense 
JTF-CNO…Joint Task Force, Computer Network Operations(formerly JTF-CND) 
QoSS……...Quality of Security Service  
PPSM……...Ports, Protocols, and Service Management 
SA…………System Administrator 
SecDef……..Secretary of Defense 
SSA………..System Security Administrator 
SSH………..Secure Shell 
TCP………..Transmission Control Protocol  























APPENDIX B – TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
Accreditation — It is the authorization granted by the designated approving authority that 
permits a DOD system to process, store, and/or transmit information.  It is based upon 
information gathered during the certification process and concerns the protection and 
defense of the information and/or the system. [BU01] 
Availability — The concept of information assurance that guarantees that the information 
or service is accessible (available) when it is sought.  
Certification — The comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-technical 
security features of a system and other safeguards to establish the extent to which a 
particular design and implementation meets a set of specified security requirements. 
[BU01] 
Information Assurance — “Measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.” [DOD03]  
Integrity — The concept of information assurance that assures that there is no 
unauthorized modification or deletion of data.   
Internet Protocol — A set of rules designed for use in interconnected systems of packet 
switched computer communication networks. [IN02] 
Internet Protocol Address — A numerical address, expressed in the format specified in 
the Internet Protocol, for devices and resources. [FU01] 
IP Address — See “Internet Protocol Address”.  
IPsec — A tunneling protocol used primarily by VPNs. 
Transmission Control Protocol — A set of rules that works in conjunction with IP that 
defines how data is sent in the form of message units between computers over a 
packet switched computer communication networks.  IP handles the actual delivery of 
the data.  TCP tracks the individual units of data, which is called a packet, that a 
message is divided into for efficient routing through the packet switched computer 
communication network. [FU01]  
Virtual Private Network (VPN) — A virtual private network that is a secure 
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APPENDIX C – INFOCON ENCLOSURE (SOURCE RA02) 
1. Purpose.  The Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) recommends actions to 
uniformly heighten or reduce defensive posture, to defend against computer network 
attacks, and to mitigate sustained damage to the DOD information infrastructure, 
including computer and telecommunications networks and systems.  The INFOCON is a 
comprehensive defense posture and response based on the status of information systems, 
military operations, and intelligence assessments of adversary capabilities and intent.  
The INFOCON system impacts all personnel who use DOD information systems, 
protects systems while supporting mission accomplishment, and coordinates the overall 
defensive effort through adherence to standards. 
 
2. Description.  The INFOCON system presents a structured, coordinated approach to 
defend against and react to adversarial attacks on DOD computer and telecommunication 
networks and systems.  While all communications systems are vulnerable to some degree, 
factors such as low-cost, readily available information technology, increased system 
connectivity, and standoff capability make computer network attack (CNA) an attractive 
option to our adversaries at present.  The DOD INFOCON criteria and response actions 
may be expanded at a later date to include all forms of information operations.  CNA is 
defined as “operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.”  
INFOCON also outlines countermeasures to scanning, probing, and other suspicious 
activity; unauthorized access; and data browsing.  DOD INFOCON measures focus on 
computer network-based protective measures, due to the unique nature of CNA 
(reference paragraph 5).  Each level reflects a defensive posture based on the risk of 
impact to military operations through the intentional disruption of friendly information 
systems.  INFOCON levels are NORMAL (normal activity), ALPHA (increased risk of 
attack), BRAVO (specific risk of attack), CHARLIE (limited attack), and DELTA 
(general attack).  Countermeasures at each level include preventive actions, actions taken 
during an attack, and damage control/mitigating actions.  
 
3. Authority.  The INFOCON system is established by the Secretary of Defense, and 
administered through the Director for Operations, Joint Staff (J-3).  The INFOCON 
system will be administered through the Commander, Joint Task Force for Computer 
Network Defense (JTF-CND), when the JTF-CND reaches initial operational capability 
(IOC).  All combatant commands, Services, directors of Defense and combat support 
agencies will develop supplemental INFOCON procedures as required, specific to their 
command and in consonance with this guidance.  Subordinate and operational unit 
commanders will use the INFOCON procedures developed by their higher headquarters 
(e.g., combatant commands or Services).  Existing policy and procedures on 
communications security (COMSEC) may be integrated into local INFOCON procedures 
at the commander’s discretion. 
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4. Applicability.  This document provides guidance for standardized procedures and sets 
responsibilities for authorizing and communicating INFOCONs as part of information 
operations (IO) throughout the Department of Defense.  The information contained herein 
applies to the Joint Staff; Services; combatant commands; Defense agencies; and joint, 
combined, and other DOD activities throughout the entire conflict spectrum -- peacetime 
through war.  
 
5. Assumptions.  Several critical assumptions were made about the nature of computer 
network attack (CNA) in developing the DOD INFOCON system.  Understanding these 
assumptions is essential to effectively implement this system. 
 
 a.  Shared Risk.  In today’s network-centric environment, risk assumed by one is 
risk shared by all.  Unlike most other military operations, a successful network intrusion 
in one area of responsibility (AOR) may, in many cases, facilitate access into other 
AORs.  This necessitates a common understanding of the situation and responses 
associated with the declared DOD INFOCON.  These actions must be carried out 
concurrently in all AORs for an effective defense. 
 
 b. Advance Preparation.  Preparation is key, given the speed and reduced 
signature of CNA.  Protective measures must be planned, prepared, exercised, and often 
executed well in advance of an attack.  Preventive measures are emphasized in 
INFOCON responses because there may be little time to react effectively during the 
attack.  Prevention of system compromise (see Appendix C for various advisories to 
consider) is preferable, but may not be achievable. 
 
 c. Anonymity of Attacker.  Attributing the attack to its ultimate source, if 
possible, will normally not occur until after the attack has been executed.  This limits the 
range and type of options available to military decision makers.  To effectively operate in 
this environment, knowledge of the adversary’s identity cannot be a prerequisite to 
execution of defensive strategies and tactics. 
 
 d.   Characterization of the Attack.  Distinguishing between hacks, attacks, system 
anomalies, and operator error may be difficult.  The most prudent approach is to assume 
malicious intent until an event is assessed otherwise.  (See Appendix C for various 
assessments to consider.)   
 
6. Structure.  This paragraph explains the INFOCON structure, including level, brief 
description, criteria to declare, and recommended actions.  The criteria listed are broad 
guidance for the commander to consider when declaring an INFOCON, not concrete 
thresholds.  All criteria for a particular INFOCON need not be met to change to that 
level.  More detailed explanation of routine security measures such as internal security 








No significant activity. • Ensure all mission critical information and information 
systems (including applications and databases) and their 
operational importance are identified.  
• Ensure all points of access and their operational necessity 
are identified.  
• On a continuing basis, conduct normal security practices. 
For example:  
• Conduct education and training for users, administrators, 
and management.  
• Ensure an effective password management program is in 
place.  
• Conduct periodic internal security reviews and external 
vulnerability assessments.  
• Conduct normal auditing, review, and file back-up 
procedures.  
• Confirm the existence of newly identified vulnerabilities 
and install patches.  
• Employ normal reporting procedures IAW para 7d.  






• Indications and warning 
(I&W) indicate general 
threat.  
• Regional events 
occurring which affect 
U.S. interests and 
involve potential 
adversaries with 
suspected or known 
CNA capability.  
• Military operation, 
contingency or exercise 
planned or ongoing 
requiring increased 
security of information 
systems.  
• Information system 
probes, scans or other 
activities detected 
indicating a pattern of 
surveillance.  
• Accomplish all actions required at INFOCON normal.  
• Execute appropriate security practices (see Appendix A). 
For example:  
• Increase level of auditing, review, and critical file back-up 
procedures.  
• Conduct internal security review on all critical systems.  
• Heighten awareness of all information system users and 
administrators.  
• Execute appropriate defensive tactics. 
• Employ normal reporting procedures IAW para 7d.  
• Review and test higher level INFOCON actions, and 





• I&W indicate targeting 
of specific system, 
location, unit or 
operation.  
• Major military operation 
or contingency, planned 
or ongoing.  
• Significant level of 
network probes, scans or 
activities detected 
• Accomplish all actions required at INFOCON ALPHA.  
• Execute appropriate security practices (see Appendix A). 
For example:  
• Increase level of auditing, review, and critical file back-up 
procedures.  
• Conduct immediate internal security review on all critical 
systems.  
• Confirm existence of newly identified vulnerabilities and 
install patches.  
• Disconnect unclassified dial-up connections not required 
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indicating a pattern of 
concentrated 
reconnaissance.  
• Network penetration or 
denial of service 
attempted with no 
impact to DOD 
operations.  
for current operation.  
• Execute appropriate defensive tactics. 
• Ensure increased reporting requirements are met IAW para 
7d.  
• Review and test higher level INFOCON actions, and 




• Intelligence attack 
assessment(s) indicate a 
limited attack.  
• Information system 
attack(s) detected with 
limited impact to DOD 
operations:  
• Minimal success, 
successfully 
counteracted.  
• Little or no data or 
systems compromised.  
• Unit able to accomplish 
mission. 
• Accomplish all actions required at INFOCON BRAVO.  
• Execute appropriate response actions. For example:  
• Conduct maximum level of auditing, review and critical 
file back-up procedures.  
• Consider minimize on appropriate computer networks and 
telecommunications systems (limit traffic to mission 
essential communication only). (Ssee Appendix E, ref. e, 
CJCSI 6900.01A)  
• Reconfigure information systems to minimize access 
points and increase security.  
• Reroute mission-critical communications through 
unaffected systems.  
• Disconnect non-mission essential -critical networks  
• Employ alternative modes of communication and 
disseminate new contact information.  
• Execute appropriate defensive tactics.  
• Ensure increased reporting requirements are met IAW para 
7d.  
• Review and test higher level INFOCON actions, and 




• Successful information 
system attack(s) detected 
which impact DOD 
operations.  
• Widespread incidents 
that undermine ability to 
function effectively.  
• Significant risk of 
mission failure. 
• Accomplish all actions required at INFOCON CHARLIE.  
• Ensure increased reporting requirements are met IAW para 
7d.  
• Execute applicable portions of continuity of operations 
plan (Ssee Appendix E, ref. f, DODD 3020.26, 
Ccontinuity of Ooperations, Ppolicy and Pplanning). 
• Designate alternate information systems and disseminate 
new communication procedures internally and externally.  
• Execute procedures for ensuring graceful degradation of 
information systems.  
• Implement procedures for conducting operations in "stand-
alone" mode or manually.  
• Isolate compromised systems from rest of network.  




 a. Determining the INFOCON.  There are three broad categories of factors 
that influence the INFOCON: operational, technical, and intelligence, including foreign 
intelligence and law enforcement intelligence.  Some factors may fall into more than one 
category.  The INFOCON level is based on significant changes in one or more of them.  
Appendix C describes several factors that may be considered when determining the 
INFOCON.  DOD organizations are frequently confronted with unauthorized access to 
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information systems.  The decision to change the INFOCON should be tempered by the 
overall operational and security context at that time.  For example, an intruder could gain 
unauthorized access and not cause damage to systems or data.  This may only warrant 
INFOCON ALPHA or NORMAL during peacetime, but may warrant INFOCON 
CHARLIE during a crisis; or it may warrant a high INFOCON at the affected unit, but 
not throughout the command or the Department of Defense as a whole.  
  
 b. Declaring INFOCONs.  The Joint Staff J3/Commander, JTF-CND (CJTF) 
will recommend changes in DOD INFOCON through the CJCS to the SecDef IAW 
paragraph 3.  Assimilation and evaluation of information to assess the CND situation 
DOD-wide will be a collaborative effort focused at the Joint Staff/JTF-CND.  The 
Secretary of Defense may delegate declaration authority to the J-3/CJTF.  Commanders 
are responsible for assessing the situation and establishing the proper INFOCON based 
on evaluation of all relevant factors.  Commanders may change the INFOCON of their 
organizations; however, they must remain at least as high as the current INFOCON 
directed by SecDef or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The commander will 
report changes in INFOCON IAW subparagraph 7d. 
 
 c. Response Measures.  Response measures associated with INFOCONs are 
normally recommended actions unless specifically directed by SecDef.  Ideally, CND 
operations will be based on advanced warning of an attack.  The intelligence community 
is developing a capability to provide warning which will become of increasing value as it 
matures.  Measures should be commensurate with the risk, the adversary’s assessed 
capability and intent, and mission requirements.  Over-aggressive countermeasures may 
result in self-inflicted degradation of system performance and communication ability, 
which may contribute to the adversary’s objectives.  Commanders must also consider the 
impact imposing a higher INFOCON for their command will have on connectivity with 
computer networks and systems of other commands.  Combatant commands will notify 
the Joint Staff if recommended or directed response measures conflict with theater 
priorities.  Additionally, response measures directed by combatant commands will take 
precedence over response measures directed by Service INFOCONs when applicable.  
Regardless of the INFOCON level declared at the affected site, it is incumbent upon the 
affected site to report all unauthorized accesses in a timely manner IAW subparagraph 
7d. 
 
 d. Reporting.  Technical reporting will be accomplished IAW reference A.  
Report violations of the law (such as unauthorized access to military computer networks 
and systems) to servicing military counterintelligence organizations IAW DODI 5240.6, 
“Counterintelligence Awareness and Briefing Program,” and with local and 
Service/command policy.  However, INFOCONs assess potential and/or actual impact to 
DOD operations and must be reported through operational channels.  Additional guidance 
on INFOCON reporting follows. 
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  (1) Reporting Channels.  Combatant commands, Services, and DOD 
agencies will report INFOCON changes and summary reports to the Joint Staff through 
the National Military Command Center (NMCC): 
 
CJCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC//J3/J33/J39// 
 
Combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies will designate a reporting 
authority and establish reporting procedures for organizational entities under their 
jurisdictions.  Service entities under the operational control of a combatant command will 
follow the reporting instructions of that combatant command.  Individual Service policy 
may require information copies to higher Service headquarters.  Those entities not 
reporting directly to a CINC will follow Service-reporting procedures (usually to the 
Service operations center, which would then forward the information to the NMCC). 
 
  (2) Reporting Frequency.  Services, combatant commands, and 
Defense agencies will report INFOCON changes to the NMCC NLT 4 hours after the 
INFOCON has changed.  Provide whatever information is available at the time and 
indicate fields that are unknown or unavailable.  Report information missing from the 
initial report in a follow-up report when it becomes available.  Services, combatant 
commands, and Defense agencies may dictate more frequent internal reporting to 
subordinate components.  
 
  (3) Report Formats.  Reports of changes in INFOCON should be 
accompanied by an operational assessment of the situation when appropriate.  Appendix 
D outlines a process for assessing the operational impact of a computer network attack.  
Reports will include, as a minimum: 
 
   (a)  For all INFOCONs:  unit/organization and location, date/time 
of report, current INFOCON, reason for declaration of this INFOCON, response actions 
taken, POC (name, rank, duty title, contact information).  
 
   (b)  INFOCON BRAVO and higher.  All of the above, plus: 
unit/organization mission, current operation(s) (name, type, and AOR) unit is supporting, 
upcoming operation(s) (name, type, AOR, and dates) unit is projected to support, Service 
computer emergency/incident response team (CERT/CIRT) or DISA Automated Systems 
Security Incident Support Team (ASSIST) incident number and law enforcement agency 
(LEA) case number with POC contact information. 
 
   (c)  INFOCON CHARLIE and higher.  All of the above, plus: 
system(s) affected (network, classification, application, database/data file), degree to 
which operational functions are affected (command and control; intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance; movement/maneuver; sustainment; fires; and protection), impact 
(actual and/or potential) on current/planned missions and/or general capabilities, 
restoration priorities, workarounds. 
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  (4) Dissemination of DOD INFOCON.  The Joint Staff/JTF-CND will 
send notification to combatant commands, Services, and agencies when the DOD 
INFOCON is changed.  Commands, Services, and agencies are responsible for notifying 
units assigned to them.  Notification will include the following information: 
 
   (a)  Date/time of report. 
   (b)  Current INFOCON. 
   (c)  Reason for declaration of this INFOCON. 
   (d)  Current/planned operation(s) or capabilities, units/organizations, 
networks, systems, applications or data assessed to be impacted or at risk. 
   (e)  Recommended or SecDef-directed actions. 
   (f)  References to relevant technical advisories, intelligence assessments, 
etc. 
   (g)  POC contact information. 
 
8. Security.  Classification guidance and disclosure policy concerning IO is addressed in 
reference c.  Specific guidance related to INFOCON follows. 
 
 a. INFOCON labels and descriptions are unclassified. 
 
 b. Generic defensive measures, when not tied to a specific INFOCON, are 
unclassified.  Specific measures may be published in a classified appendix, if required. 
 
 c. Measures to be taken by all personnel, regardless of INFOCON, are 
unclassified. 
 
 d. General criteria to declare an INFOCON are FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
(FOUO).  Specific criteria may be published in a classified appendix, if required. 
 
 e. Classification of the measures associated with a particular INFOCON is the 
responsibility of the originator and will be classified according to content.  However, the 
measures associated with a particular INFOCON, in aggregate, may require a higher 
classification than the individual measures.  The measures associated with a particular 
INFOCON, in aggregate, will be FOUO at a minimum.  
 
 f. The operational impact of a successful information attack is classified 
SECRET or higher. 
 
 g. CNA intelligence assessments are classified SECRET or higher. 
 
 h. Information associated with an ongoing criminal investigation of a CNA may 
be considered law-enforcement sensitive.  
 
 i. A combatant command, Service, or agency may authorize release of its 
INFOCON system and procedures to allies or coalition partners as necessary to ensure 
effective protection of its information systems.  Locally developed INFOCON procedures 
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should use DODI 3600.2 and the guidance above when considering release to allies or 
coalition partners. 
 
 j. Changes in INFOCON are operational security (OPSEC) indicators and must 
be protected accordingly.  The criteria and response measures are also of value to foreign 
intelligence Services in assessing the effectiveness of a CNA and in analyzing DOD’s 
response.  Do not post INFOCON procedures in publicly accessible locations such as unit 
web pages on unclassified networks and bulletin boards accessible to outsiders. 
 
9. Relationship of INFOCON to Other Alert Systems.  The INFOCON, 
THREATCON, DEFCON, CNA-WATCHCON, and conventional WATCHCON all 
interact with each other when the situation warrants it.  The INFOCON may be changed 
based on the world situation (THREATCON, DEFCON), the intelligence community’s 
level of concern (CNA-WATCHCON, conventional WATCHCON), or other factors 
(reference Appendix C).  Likewise, a change in INFOCON may prompt a corresponding 
change in other alert systems. 
 
 a. The defense condition (DEFCON) is a uniform system of progressive 
conditions describing the types of actions required to bring a command’s readiness to the 
level required by the situation (reference d). 
 
 b. The threat condition (THREATCON) is a process that sets the level for a 
terrorist threat condition at a given location, based on existing intelligence and other 
information. 
 
 c. A watch condition (WATCHCON) is part of the defense warning system 
indicating the degree of intelligence concern with a particular warning problem.  
 
 d. A CNA-WATCHCON is an intelligence assessment that takes into account 
CNA threat levels, as well as the overall political situation (reference b). 
 
 e. The INFOCON addresses risk of attack and protective measures for 




 a. Exercises.  INFOCON procedures should be practiced in all joint and/or 
combatant command exercises. 
 
 b. Combatant commands, Services, and agencies are requested to submit 
feedback to the Joint Staff on the effectiveness of the INFOCON system based on real-
world and exercise data.  The Joint Staff will review the system periodically to ensure it 
satisfies operational requirements. 
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11. These procedures are effective immediately and will remain in effect until superseded 
by DOD instruction.  
 
12. List of Appendixes 
 
 a. General Security Practices. 
 b. Defensive Tactics. 
 c. Factors Influencing the INFOCON.  See Annex A to Appendix C:  CNA 
Intelligence Assessment Sample Format. 
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APPENDIX A - GENERAL SECURITY PRACTICES 
 
Listed below are several measures that can significantly reduce the risk of 
successful attack against a critical information system.  These activities should be the 
foundation of a sound, prevention-based information assurance/security program. 
 
 a. System Security Administration.  All DOD activities must ensure their 
systems are administered by technically qualified, experienced personnel who are 
provided periodic professional training in system administration and security, as well as 
the necessary tools to assist in effective baseline management, auditing, and network 
intrusion detection.  Configuration management, proper staffing, and strong systems 
policies are critical to reliable and secure operations. 
 
 b. Auditing/Log Review.  All DOD activities should regularly review audit 
logs for suspicious activity, IAW Appendix E, reference a and locally existing guidance.  
Logging and review requirements may increase with increases in INFOCON, including 
more frequent reviews, focused string searches, analysis of activity below normal trigger 
thresholds, and submission of logs to an organization designated to conduct specialized 
reviews. 
 
 c. Critical File Back-up Procedures.  All DOD activities should conduct 
periodic back-ups of files critical to mission accomplishment, IAW Appendix E, 
reference a and locally existing guidance.  Storage of back-up files should be isolated 
from any network and physically separated from the originating facility.  Increases in 
INFOCON may warrant changes in the frequency of back-ups from quarterly, monthly, 
or weekly to daily or real-time.  
 
 d. Internal Security Reviews.  All DOD activities should establish procedures 
for conducting internal security reviews, IAW reference a and locally existing guidance.  
These reviews should consist of, as a minimum, the following actions:  
 
  (1) Check password strengths (searching for default and weak passwords). 
      (2) Review pertinent technical advisories; install patches, implement fixes, 
execute preventive/mitigating actions. 
  (3) Conduct information system vulnerability scans. 
  (4) Identify network access points and their operational importance. 
  (5) Raise awareness level of all users as new vulnerabilities are found. 
  (6) Examine historically dormant/infrequently used accounts for signs of  
   unusual activity. 
 
 e. External Vulnerability Assessments.  All DOD activities should establish 
procedures for coordinating with outside agencies (e.g., Service CERTs/CIRTs, DISA, 
and NSA) to conduct vulnerability assessments and analyses of their information 
systems, IAW existing guidance.  These assessments may include network scans, OPSEC 
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APPENDIX B - DEFENSIVE TACTICS 
 
1. The following list of defensive tactics offers possible responses to several 
types of suspicious/unauthorized activity.  Defensive tactics should not be executed 
without some knowledge of the degree to which an intruder has penetrated the system 
and careful consideration of the potential, practical and legal consequences.  For instance, 
changing passwords to lock out unauthorized access to valid accounts may not be prudent 
if a sniffer has been installed which can capture the new passwords. 
 
2. Types of Activity.  Adversary activity may be categorized as 
reconnaissance/suspicious activity, unauthorized access, denial of service, data browsing, 
data corruption, and malicious code.  Conducting activities such as data browsing and 
data corruption is dependent upon gaining access to the system.  Therefore, actions that 
prevent or halt unauthorized access might also be used to counteract data browsing and 
corruption. 
 
3. General Actions.  The following actions may or may not be valid responses 
to several or all types of malicious activity.  The decision whether or not to employ them 
depends on the severity of the attack, and the practical and legal issues relating to such 
actions. 
 
 a. Disseminate reports/alert messages with suspicious Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses, attack profiles/signatures.  
 
 b. Review thresholds for defensive systems (e.g., firewalls) and update for 
new/detected threats. 
 
 c. Freeze/eliminate compromised or unauthorized accounts. 
 
 d. Isolate affected network segment. 
 
 e. Re-route intruder to dummy network. 
 
 f. Jam communication lines.  
 
 g. Review thresholds for defensive systems and update for new/detected 
threats. 
 
 h. Tag critical files. 
 
 i. Block offending IP addresses/telephone lines. 
 




 k. Re-route intruder to a decoy system and continue logging activity. 
 
 l. Refer to identified technical advisories/alerts (Service CERTs/CIRTs, 
DISA ASSIST, NSA IPC, etc.). 
 
 m. Recall key information system security personnel. 
 
 n. Activate crisis action team to respond to impact of adversary CNA. 
 
4. Reconnaissance/Suspicious Activity   
 
 a. Description.  Automated scans/manual probes of networks to ascertain if 
the target system has known vulnerabilities or to get general information about the target 
system.   
 
 b. Possible defensive actions include reconstructing the scan/probing to 
determine what information was revealed, monitoring all incoming activity from the 
source IP address, blocking all access from the source IP address. 
 
5. Denial of Service 
 
 a. Description:  any action that causes all or part of the affected network’s 
service to be stopped entirely, interrupted, or degraded sufficiently to impact network 
operations.  Service may be denied by crashing the system, jamming it with packets, or 
consuming disk space, processor time or other resources.  
 
 b. Possible defensive actions include blocking all incoming activity from the 
source IP address/phone line. 
 
6. Unauthorized Access 
 
 a. Description.  Entry into and use of a system by an unauthorized individual. 
 
 b. Possible defensive actions include changing passwords; blocking all 
access from the source IP address; freezing/eliminating compromised, infrequently used, 
or historically dormant user accounts. 
 
7. Data Browsing 
 
 a. Description.  Unauthorized reading, capturing and/or downloading of 
information stored on or transmitted over a network. 
 
 b. Possible defensive actions for stored information include: encrypt 
files/directories; generate dummy files to confuse browsers; hide and/or rename key files 
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or directories; transfer sensitive files from servers to auxiliary storage media; tag 
potential target files. 
 
 c. Possible defensive actions for transmitted information include point-to-
point encryption, flooding transmission lines with useless information, employing 
COMSEC procedures (limit traffic, use codes), using cover accounts. 
 
8. Data Corruption 
 
 a. Description.  Unauthorized modification of the contents of a file, database, 
or transmission.  Ranges from subtle alterations that may not be noticed to complete 
destruction of the information, rendering the file, database, or transmission unusable. 
 
 b. Possible defensive actions include resetting file/directory access controls; 
backing up key verifiable files onto CD-ROM; using back-up files; storing key 
files/databases on removable storage media; employing checksums, signature files, and 
file tagging; developing a counter-deception plan. 
 
9. Malicious Logic 
 
 a. Description.  Hardware, software, or firmware intentionally inserted into 
an information system for an unauthorized purpose (e.g., Virus and Trojan horse). 
 
 b. Possible defensive actions include updating virus signature files and 
running appropriate virus detection/eradication software (if virus is known); checking all 
systems and signature files for unauthorized files or changes to files; removing user-
specific, nonstandard applications; removing intranet web pages containing executable 
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APPENDIX C - FACTORS INFLUENCING THE INFOCON 
 
When determining the appropriate defensive posture, many factors must be 
considered.  This appendix lists several factors that commanders should consider when 
determining the INFOCON.  (Note:  This list is offered as broad guidance; other factors 
may be considered also.) 
 
 a. CNA-WATCHCON and threat warning assessments (reference b).  
Paragraph 9 and reference b provide more information on CNA-WATCHCONs.  Also, 
other threat-warning assessments may be considered when determining the INFOCON. 
 
 b. Other indications & warning (including domestic threats).  NSA IPC 
Alerts; National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) advisories, threats, warnings; 
Service law enforcement agency intrusion reports, etc. 
 
 c. CNA intelligence assessment.  (See Annex A for sample format).  This 
report provides a fused intelligence assessment of the attack.  US intelligence 
organizations work within legal restrictions on collecting and retaining information on 
US persons, IAW Executive Order 12333 and implementing DOD and Service 
regulations.  Intelligence personnel will ensure mission accomplishment and compliance 
with relevant intelligence law by coordinating closely with law  enforcement personnel.  
In the event that a CNA assessment leads intelligence personnel to US person 
information which they are legally prevented from pursuing further, they will transfer the 
matter to appropriate law enforcement organization, who will then produce a similar 
CNA assessment report, sanitized to protect law enforcement-sensitive information. 
 
 d. Conventional WATCHCON.  Conventional warnings on actors with CNA 
capability may suggest an increased risk of CNA from those actors. 
 
 e. Current world situation.  Increased tensions with a nation possessing CNA 
capability may precede CNA operations against us. 
 
 f. Other alert systems such as DEFCON, THREATCON, etc.  Reference d, 
paragraph 9, and local security procedures discuss various alert systems.  Local 
commanders must determine if a change in one alert status will cause a corresponding 
change in another alert status. 
 
 g. Current/planned military operations.  The operational context within 
which an event occurs is critical to determining the appropriate level of response.  Any 
contingencies, crisis actions, exercises, or other operations a unit is supporting or 
projected to support must be considered when determining the INFOCON. 
 
 h. Dependence of military functions upon particular information systems.  
Applications directly supporting military functions (i.e., command and control; 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; movement and maneuver; fires; and 
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sustainment) may be predominantly resident on a single network or system.  For 
example, the Global Transportation Network (GTN) is an NIPRNET-based application.  
If NIPRNET is the affected system, GTN and consequently the sustainment function may 
be adversely impacted.  This type of analysis may suggest the degree to which a 
particular network, system, application or database is mission critical. 
 
 i. Commander’s assessment of mission-critical information system 
readiness.  Conceptually similar to ‘status of resources and training system’ (sorts).  
Commanders may base unit ability to accomplish the mission in part on the readiness of 
unit computer networks and systems.  This readiness may be determined from the 
networks’ security posture, vulnerability, extent of compromise, etc.  
 
 j. Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) bulletins.   See 
reference a for format and explanation. 
 
 k. Incident reports.  These are roughly analogous to tactical warning/attack 
assessment.  See reference a for format and explanation. 
 
 l. Trend analyses.  Reports showing number, type, and frequency of attacks; 
systems targeted; hot IP addresses, etc.  See reference a for format and explanation. 
 
 m. Technical impact assessment.  This information may be included in an 
incident report, or may result from follow-on analysis.  This assessment may include the 
extent of system compromise and/or disruption and the degree to which system 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and non-repudiation have been 
affected.  See reference a for an explanation of these terms. 
 
 n. Operational impact assessment--a key element in determining the 
INFOCON.  (See Appendix D for procedures.)  The process for assessing operational 
impact also lays the groundwork for executing preventive measures, developing 
workarounds, and establishing restoration priorities. 
 
 o. Commander’s assessment of the potential for an information attack.  
Although much objective data is available on which to base the decision, the final 
judgment for declaring an INFOCON change rests with the commander.  Objective 
assessment of the situation and prudent analysis of all available information must be 
integrated with the commander’s experience and leadership to determine the 
organization’s appropriate defensive posture. 
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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C  
CNA INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT SAMPLE FORMAT 
 
1. Reference.  CNA incident source reports (include originating agency, 
message DTG). 
 
2. Executive Summary.  Between 1 and 4 sentences summarizing significant 
elements of report. 
 
3. Incident Summary.  The following information is available from incident 
reports (reference a) and is included as background in this section of the intelligence 
assessment report: 
 
 a. Time and duration of incident. 
 b. CNA technique employed. 
 c. Path of attack/identification and location of origin of attack. 
 d. Location of system/network targeted. 
 e. Unit subordination of system/network targeted. 
 f. Mission of system/network targeted. 
 g. Actual impact of attack. 
 h. Potential impact of attack. 
 
4. Intelligence Assessment.  Consistent with intelligence law restrictions on the 
collection of US person information, the following information will be generated by 
intelligence analysts and included in this section of the intelligence assessment report: 
 
 a. Assessed source of attack.  (Who did it?  A certain terrorist group, 
government, or sub-organization defined to the best extent possible.) 
 
 b. Assessed type of attack.  (What did they do?  How?  Provide simple 
explanation of the technical basis of the attack technique or tools from the perspective of 
insights into adversary capabilities.) 
 
 c. Assessed motivation of attack.  (Why did they do it?  Collect intelligence, 
implant malicious logic, harass/distract, disrupt operations, etc.) 
 
 d. Supporting analysis for both of the above assessments.  (In addition to the 
logical inferences based on the current situation, background data should be provided—
known CNA organizations, past practices, doctrine, etc.) 
 
 e. Contextual data on the situation.  (What else is going on other than CNA 
that is potentially relevant to the current situation?) 
 
 f. Follow-on projection.  (What can we expect next from the perpetrator?  
What about use of the particular CNA technique by others?) 
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APPENDIX D - OPERATIONAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
 
1. Assessing the impact of CNA on our ability to conduct military operations is 
key to conducting damage assessment, prioritizing response actions, and assisting in 
identifying possible adversaries.  This appendix offers an operational impact assessment 
process that may be used when reporting changes in INFOCON.  Note: assessment 
results are classified SECRET at a minimum.  The assessment process itself is 
unclassified. 
 
2. Prior to an attack: 
 
 a. Identify all critical information systems. 
 
 b. For each critical information system, identify all resident critical 
applications and databases. 
 
 c. Determine which military functions are supported by each 
application/database: command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance; movement and maneuver; fires; sustainment; and protection. 
 
3. After an attack or attempted attack has been detected: 
 
 a. Identify all critical information systems targeted. 
 
 b. List operations the unit is currently supporting or projected to support in 
the near future. 
 
 c. For each information system targeted, determine the technical impact, i.e., 
to what degree are confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and non-
repudiation affected?  What critical applications and databases are impacted?  
 
 d. For the technical impacts identified, estimate the time and resources 
required to restore functionality.  Identify any interim workarounds. 
 
 e. How does the technical impact of the attack affect the unit’s ability to 
function? 
 
 f. How does the impact to the unit’s ability to function affect support to 
current/projected operations?  If no specific operations are ongoing or projected, how is 
general capability/readiness affected? 
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APPENDIX E - REFERENCES 
 
  a. CJCSI 6510.01b, Defensive Information Operations Implementation 
 
b. DIA message 021727z JUN 98, Indications and Warning for Information 
Warfare/Information Operations {CNA-WATCHCON} 
c. DODI 3600.2, Classification Guidance for Information Operations 
 
d. CJCSM 3402.01A, Alert System of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 
 
e. CJCSI 6900.01A, Telecommunications Economy and Discipline 
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APPENDIX D – FPCON (SOURCE JO01) 
The terrorist force protection conditions, FPCONs, outlined below describe the 
progressive level of a terrorist threat to all US military facilities and personnel under 
DOD Directive O-2000.12. As approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
terminology and definitions are recommended security measures designed to ease inter-
Service coordination and support of US military antiterrorism activities. The purpose of 
the FPCON system is accessibility to, and easy dissemination of, appropriate information. 
The DOD Directive O-2000.12 recommended measures are:  
• FPCON NORMAL exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists 
but warrants only a routine security posture.  
• FPCON ALPHA applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity 
against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and 
circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO measures. 
However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher FPCONs 
resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this FPCON 
must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.  
• Measure 1. At regular intervals, remind all personnel and dependents to be 
suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying 
suitcases or other containers. Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the 
vicinity of US installations. Watch for abandoned parcels or suitcases and any 
unusual activity.  
• Measure 2. The duty officer or personnel with access to building plans as well 
as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Key personnel 
should be able to seal off an area immediately. Key personnel required to 
implement security plans should be on-call and readily available.  
• Measure 3. Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.  
• Measure 4. Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the 
installation and unclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the United States.  
• Measure 5. Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with 
a reasonable flow of traffic.  
• Measure 6. As a deterrent, apply measures 14, 15, 17, or 18 from FPCON 
BRAVO either individually or in combination with each other.  
• Measure 7. Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic 
requirements related to the introduction of higher THREATCONs.  
• Measure 8. Review and implement security measures for high-risk personnel 
as appropriate.  
• Measure 9. As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and mutual 
antiterrorism measures.  
• FPCON BRAVO applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist 
activity exists. The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained for 
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weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and 
aggravating relations with local authorities.  
• Measure 11. Repeat measure 1 and warn personnel of any other potential form 
of terrorist attack.  
• Measure 12. Keep all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist 
contingency plans on call.  
• Measure 13. Check plans for implementation of the next FPCON.  
• Measure 14. Move cars and objects (e.g., crates, trash containers) at least 25 
meters from buildings, particularly buildings of a sensitive or prestigious 
nature. Consider centralized parking.  
• Measure 15. Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage 
areas not in regular use.  
• Measure 16. At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at other 
regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in 
regular use for suspicious packages.  
• Measure 17. Examine mail (above the regular examination process) for letter 
or parcel bombs.  
• Measure 18. Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. Advise dependents to 
check home deliveries.  
• Measure 19. Increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, 
messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense, and to 
build confidence among staff and dependents.  
• Measure 20. Make staff and dependents aware of the general situation in order 
to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.  
• Measure 21. At an early stage, inform members of local security committees 
of actions being taken. Explain reasons for actions.  
• Measure 22. Physically inspect visitors and randomly inspect their suitcases, 
parcels, and other containers. Identify the visitor's destination. Ensure that 
proper dignity is maintained, and if possible, ensure that female visitors are 
inspected only by a female qualified to conduct physical inspections.  
• Measure 23. Operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.  
• Measure 24. Protect off-base military personnel and military vehicles in 
accordance with prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock vehicles and check 
vehicles before entering or exiting the vehicle.  
• Measure 25. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel 
as appropriate.  
• Measure 26. Brief personnel who may augment guard forces on the use of 
deadly force. Ensure that there is no misunderstanding of these instructions.  
• Measures 27. As appropriate, consult local authorities on the threat and 
mutual antiterrorism measures.  
• FPCON CHARLIE applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received 
indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. 
Implementation of measures in this FPCON for more than a short period probably 
will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.  
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• Measure 30. Continue, or introduce, all measures listed in FPCON BRAVO.  
• Measure 31. Keep all personnel responsible for implementing antiterrorist 
plans at their places of duty.  
• Measure 32. Limit access points to the absolute minimum.  
• Measure 33. Strictly enforce control of entry. Randomly search vehicles.  
• Measure 34. Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive 
buildings.  
• Measure 35. Issue weapons to guards. Local orders should include specific 
orders on issue of ammunition.  
• Measure 36. Increase patrolling of the installation.  
• Measure 37. Protect all designated vulnerable points. Give special attention to 
vulnerable points outside the military establishment.  
• Measure 38. Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.  
• Measure 39. Consult local authorities about closing public (and military) 
roads and facilities that might make sites more vulnerable to attacks.  
• FPCON DELTA applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred 
or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location 
or person is likely. Normally, this FPCON is declared as a localized condition.  
• Measure 41. Continue, or introduce, all measures listed for FPCONs BRAVO 
and CHARLIE.  
• Measure 42. Augment guards as necessary.  
• Measure 43. Identify all vehicles within operational or mission-support areas.  
• Measure 44. Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to 
the installation.  
• Measure 45. Control access and implement positive identification of all 
personnel--no exceptions.  
• Measure 46. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages; etc., brought into the 
installation.  
• Measure 47. Control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the United 
States.  
• Measure 48. Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking 
areas.  
• Measure 49. Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.  
Measure 50. Coordinate the possible closing of public and military roads and 
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APPENDIX E – HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL 
DIRECTIVE - 3 (SOURCE WH01) 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3  
Purpose  
The Nation requires a Homeland Security Advisory System to provide a 
comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the 
risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State, and local authorities and to the American 
people. Such a system would provide warnings in the form of a set of graduated 
"Threat Conditions" that would increase as the risk of the threat increases. At 
each Threat Condition, Federal departments and agencies would implement a 
corresponding set of "Protective Measures" to further reduce vulnerability or 
increase response capability during a period of heightened alert.  
This system is intended to create a common vocabulary, context, and structure 
for an ongoing national discussion about the nature of the threats that confront 
the homeland and the appropriate measures that should be taken in response. 
It seeks to inform and facilitate decisions appropriate to different levels of 
government and to private citizens at home and at work.  
Homeland Security Advisory System  
The Homeland Security Advisory System shall be binding on the executive branch and 
suggested, although voluntary, to other levels of government and the private sector. There are 
five Threat Conditions, each identified by a description and corresponding color. From lowest to 
highest, the levels and colors are:  
Low = Green;  
Guarded = Blue; 
Elevated = Yellow; 
High = Orange; 
Severe = Red.  
The higher the Threat Condition, the greater the risk of a terrorist attack. Risk includes both the 
probability of an attack occurring and its potential gravity. Threat Conditions shall be assigned by 
the Attorney General in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. 
Except in exigent circumstances, the Attorney General shall seek the views of the appropriate 
Homeland Security Principals or their subordinates, and other parties as appropriate, on the 
Threat Condition to be assigned. Threat Conditions may be assigned for the entire Nation, or they 
may be set for a particular geographic area or industrial sector. Assigned Threat Conditions shall 
be reviewed at regular intervals to determine whether adjustments are warranted.  
For facilities, personnel, and operations inside the territorial United States, all Federal 
departments, agencies, and offices other than military facilities shall conform their existing threat 
advisory systems to this system and henceforth administer their systems consistent with the 
determination of the Attorney General with regard to the Threat Condition in effect.  
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The assignment of a Threat Condition shall prompt the implementation of an appropriate set of 
Protective Measures. Protective Measures are the specific steps an organization shall take to 
reduce its vulnerability or increase its ability to respond during a period of heightened alert. The 
authority to craft and implement Protective Measures rests with the Federal departments and 
agencies. It is recognized that departments and agencies may have several preplanned sets of 
responses to a particular Threat Condition to facilitate a rapid, appropriate, and tailored response. 
Department and agency heads are respon-sible for developing their own Protective Measures 
and other antiterrorism or self-protection and continuity plans, and resourcing, rehearsing, 
documenting, and maintaining these plans. Likewise, they retain the authority to respond, as 
necessary, to risks, threats, incidents, or events at facilities within the specific jurisdiction of their 
department or agency, and, as authorized by law, to direct agencies and industries to implement 
their own Protective Measures. They shall continue to be responsible for taking all appropriate 
proactive steps to reduce the vulnerability of their personnel and facilities to terrorist attack. 
Federal department and agency heads shall submit an annual written report to the President, 
through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, describing the steps they have 
taken to develop and implement appropriate Protective Measures for each Threat Condition. 
Governors, mayors, and the leaders of other organizations are encouraged to conduct a similar 
review of their organizations= Protective Measures.  
The decision whether to publicly announce Threat Conditions shall be made on a case-by-case 
basis by the Attorney General in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security. Every effort shall be made to share as much information regarding the threat as 
possible, consistent with the safety of the Nation. The Attorney General shall ensure, consistent 
with the safety of the Nation, that State and local government officials and law enforcement 
authorities are provided the most relevant and timely information. The Attorney General shall be 
responsible for identifying any other information developed in the threat assessment process that 
would be useful to State and local officials and others and conveying it to them as permitted 
consistent with the constraints of classification. The Attorney General shall establish a process 
and a system for conveying relevant information to Federal, State, and local government officials, 
law enforcement authorities, and the private sector expeditiously.  
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General shall ensure that a continuous and 
timely flow of integrated threat assessments and reports is provided to the President, the Vice 
President, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Whenever 
possible and practicable, these integrated threat assessments and reports shall be reviewed and 
commented upon by the wider interagency community.  
A decision on which Threat Condition to assign shall integrate a variety of considerations. This 
integration will rely on qualitative assessment, not quantitative calculation. Higher Threat 
Conditions indicate greater risk of a terrorist act, with risk including both probability and gravity. 
Despite best efforts, there can be no guarantee that, at any given Threat Condition, a terrorist 
attack will not occur. An initial and important factor is the quality of the threat information itself. 
The evaluation of this threat information shall include, but not be limited to, the following factors:  
1. To what degree is the threat information credible?  
2. To what degree is the threat information corroborated?  
3. To what degree is the threat specific and/or imminent?  
4. How grave are the potential consequences of the threat?  
Threat Conditions and Associated Protective Measures  
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The world has changed since September 11, 2001. We remain a Nation at risk to terrorist attacks 
and will remain at risk for the foreseeable future. At all Threat Conditions, we must remain 
vigilant, prepared, and ready to deter terrorist attacks. The following Threat Conditions each 
represent an increasing risk of terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat Condition are some 
suggested Protective Measures, recognizing that the heads of Federal departments and agencies 
are responsible for developing and implementing appropriate agency-specific Protective 
Measures:  
1. Low Condition (Green). This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist 
attacks. Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general 
measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and 
implement:  
1. Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures;  
2. Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory 
System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and  
3. Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are 
regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable 
measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.  
2. Guarded Condition (Blue). This condition is declared when there is a general risk of 
terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat 
Condition, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general 
measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop 
and implement:  
1. Checking communications with designated emergency response or command 
locations;  
2. Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and  
3. Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act 
appropriately.  
3. Elevated Condition (Yellow). An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a 
significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the 
previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the 
following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop 
and implement:  
1. Increasing surveillance of critical locations;  
2. Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;  
3. Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further 
refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and  
4. Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.  
4. High Condition (Orange). A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of 
terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat 
Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general 
measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop 
and implement:  
1. Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces 
organizations;  
2. Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering 
alternative venues or even cancellation;  
3. Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate 
site or dispersing their workforce; and  
4. Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.  
5. Severe Condition (Red). A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. 
Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not 
intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective 
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Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also 
should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific 
Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:  
1. Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs;  
2. Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing 
specially trained teams or resources;  
3. Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and  
4. Closing public and government facilities.  
Comment and Review Periods  
The Attorney General, in consultation and coordination with the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security, shall, for 45 days from the date of this directive, seek the views of 
government officials at all levels and of public interest groups and the private sector on the 
proposed Homeland Security Advisory System.  
One hundred thirty-five days from the date of this directive the Attorney General, after 
consultation and coordination with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and 
having considered the views received during the comment period, shall recommend to the 






APPENDIX F – INFOCON POLICY RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 
Normal 
• Identify all mission critical information and information systems (including 
applications and databases) and their operational importance. 
• Identify all points of access and their operational necessity. 
• Conduct periodic internal security reviews. 
• Ensure an effective password management program is in place. 
• Conduct education and training for users, administrators, and management. 
• Heighten awareness of all information system users and administrators. 
• Confirm the existence of newly identified vulnerabilities and install patches. 
• Conduct internal security review on all critical systems. 
• Review and test higher level INFOCON measures. 
• Consider proactive execution of higher INFOCON measures. 
 
Necessary 
• Conduct immediate internal security review on all critical systems.  
• Confirm existence of newly identified vulnerabilities and install patches. 
• Review and test higher level INFOCON measures. 
• Consider proactive execution of higher INFOCON measures. 
 
Critical 
• Employ alternative modes of communication and disseminate new contact 
information. 
• Review and test higher level INFOCON measures. 
• Consider proactive execution of higher INFOCON measures. 
 
Grave 
• Execute applicable portions of continuity of operations plan  
• Disseminate new communication procedures internally and externally. 
• Execute procedures for ensuring graceful degradation of information systems. 





































APPENDIX G – APACHE WEB SERVER SCRIPT 

















echo "cd .." 
sleep 2 
# 
echo "./usr/local/sbin/apachectl stop" 
sleep 3 
# 
echo "tftp 10.1.2.10" 
sleep 1 
echo "mode binary" 
sleep 1 
# 
#get [host1:]file1 [host2:]file2 ... [hostN:]fileN 
# 
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APPENDIX H – GATEWAY ROUTER CONFIGURATION FILES 
(SOURCE CI01, FI01, KO01, NA05, RO01, ST01) 
noACL.txt  
!Disable following servers 
no service tcp-small-servers 
no service udp-small-servers 
no ip bootp server 
no service finger 
no ip http server 
! 
!Disable following services 
no cdp run 
no service config 
no ip source-route 
no ip subnet-zero 
! 
!Configure the console and the virtual terminal lines () to time out a session 
!Require a password at login and to allow only telnet traffic.  
line con 0 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
line aux 0 
no exec 
exec-timeout 0 5 
no login 
transport input none 
line vty 0 4 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
! 
!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 thesis 
! 
!Configure passwords for the console, aux, and the virtual terminal lines. 
!Use a different password for each line.  
line con 0 
password jennifer 
line aux 0 
password jennifer 




!Provide protection for above passwords by the following global config cmd. 
service password-encryption 
! 
!Clear out a previous acl 
no access-list 100 
no access-list 102 







ip address 10.1.2.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
line vty 0 4 
! 
!Enable the router’s logging capability 
logging on 
! 
!Syslog level to be sent to the router console 
logging console errors 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the router console. 
no logging monitor 
! 
!Set the IP address of the log host 
logging 10.1.2.10 
! 
!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap errors 
! 
!set all log messages with the same IP source address of a router interface. 
logging source-interface e1 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 





!Based on NSA 60min Security Guide 
! 
!Disable following servers 
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no service tcp-small-servers 
no service udp-small-servers 
no ip bootp server 
no service finger 
no ip http server 
! 
!Disable following services 
no cdp run 
no service config 
no ip source-route 
no ip subnet-zero 
! 
!Configure the console and the virtual terminal lines () to time out a session 
!Require a password at login and to allow only telnet traffic.  
line con 0 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
line aux 0 
no exec 
exec-timeout 0 5 
no login 
transport input none 
line vty 0 4 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
! 
!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 thesis 
! 
!Configure passwords for the console, aux, and the virtual terminal lines. 
!Use a different password for each line.  
line con 0 
password jennifer 
line aux 0 
password jennifer 
line vty 0 4 
password jennifer 
! 
!Provide protection for above passwords by the following global config cmd. 
service password-encryption 
! 
!Clear out a previous acl 
no access-list 100 
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no access-list 102 
no access-list 105 
access-list 100 permit ip 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 any 
access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!Protect the router against the TCP SYN Attack. 
!denies anyone from any external network from starting any TCP connection 
access-list 100 permit tcp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 established 
! 
access-list 100 permit tcp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
access-list 100 permit ip any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
!Allow inbound to the protected network (e.g.,10.1.2.0) only  
!ICMP message types: Echo Reply, Destination Unreachable 
access-list 100 permit icmp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 echo-reply 
access-list 100 permit icmp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 unreachable 
! 
!Allow only trusted addresses to port 53 
access-list 100 permit tcp host 10.1.2.6 host 0.0.0.0 eq 53 log 
access-list 100 permit udp host 10.1.2.6 host 0.0.0.0 eq 53 log 
! 
!Provide IP address spoof protection for inbound traffic to protected network (e.g. 
10.1.2.0). 
!access-list 100 deny ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any log 
!access-list 100 deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any log 
access-list 100 deny ip 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any log 
access-list 100 deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any log 
access-list 100 deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any log 
access-list 100 deny ip 224.0.0.0 15.255.255.255 any log 
! 
!Block inbound traceroute from a Unix computer 
access-list 100 deny udp any any range 33434 33534 log 
! 
!Force the router to log the src and dest ports for denied TCP and UDP traffic. 
access-list 100 deny udp any range 0 65535 any range 0 65535 log 
access-list 100 deny tcp any range 0 65535 any range 0 65535 log 
! 
access-list 100 deny icmp any any log 




ip access-group 100 in 
! 
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!Set logging on an extended IP access-list statement 
access-list 102 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 80 
access-list 102 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!Provide IP address spoof protection for outbound traffic from protected network 
(e.g. 10.1.2.0). 
access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!allow outbound from the protected network (e.g.,10.1.2.0) only  
!ICMP message types: Echo 
access-list 102 permit icmp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any echo 
access-list 102 deny icmp any any log 




ip address 10.1.2.1 255.255.255.0 
ip access-group 102 in 
! 
!Allow Telnet access from certain computers on the protected network (e.g., 
14.4.4.0) to the router  
!via an extended IP access-list. The administrator can telnet to any interface IP 
address on the  
!router.  
access-list 105 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 23 log 
access-list 105 deny ip any any log 
line vty 0 4 
access-class 105 in 
! 
!Enable the router’s logging capability 
logging on 
! 
!Syslog level to be sent to the router console 
logging console errors 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the router console. 
!no logging monitor 
! 
!Set the IP address of the log host 
logging 10.1.2.10 
! 
!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap errors 
! 
!how to set time information for the logging and debugging. 
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!ntp server 10.1.2.10 
!ntp server 10.1.2.10 
!ntp source Ethernet0/1 
!service timestamps log datetime localtime show-timezone 
!service timestamps debug datetime localtime show-timezone 
!clock timezone EST –5 
!clock summer-time EDT recurring 
! 
!set all log messages with the same IP source address of a router interface. 
logging source-interface e1 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 





!Based on NSA 60min Security Guide 
! 
!Disable following servers 
no service tcp-small-servers 
no service udp-small-servers 
no ip bootp server 
no service finger 
no ip http server 
! 
!Disable following services 
no cdp run 
no service config 
no ip source-route 
no ip subnet-zero 
! 
!Configure the console and the virtual terminal lines () to time out a session 
!Require a password at login and to allow only telnet traffic.  
line con 0 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
line aux 0 
no exec 
exec-timeout 0 5 
no login 
transport input none 
line vty 0 4 
exec-timeout 5 0 
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login 
transport input telnet 
! 
!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 thesis 
! 
!Configure passwords for the console, aux, and the virtual terminal lines. 
!Use a different password for each line.  
line con 0 
password jennifer 
line aux 0 
password jennifer 
line vty 0 4 
password jennifer 
! 
!Provide protection for above passwords by the following global config cmd. 
service password-encryption 
! 
!Clear out a previous acl 
no access-list 100 
no access-list 102 
no access-list 105 
access-list 100 permit ip 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 any 
access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!Protect the router against the TCP SYN Attack. 
!denies anyone from any external network from starting any TCP connection 
access-list 100 permit tcp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 established 
! 
access-list 100 permit tcp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
access-list 100 permit ip any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
!Allow only trusted addresses to port 53 
access-list 100 permit tcp host 10.1.2.6 host 0.0.0.0 eq 53 log 
access-list 100 permit udp host 10.1.2.6 host 0.0.0.0 eq 53 log 
! 
!Block all inbound icmp 
access-list 100 deny icmp any any log 
!access-list 100 deny ip any any log 
! 
!Block inbound traceroute from a Unix computer 





ip access-group 100 in 
! 
!Set logging on an extended IP access-list statement 
access-list 102 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 80 
access-list 102 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!Provide IP address spoof protection for outbound traffic from protected network 
(e.g.,10.1.2.0). 
access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!Block all outbound icmp 
access-list 102 deny icmp any any log 




ip address 10.1.2.1 255.255.255.0 
ip access-group 102 in 
! 
!Allow Telnet access from certain computers on the protected network (e.g., 
14.4.4.0) to the router  
!via an extended IP access-list. The administrator can telnet to any interface IP 
address on the  
!router.  
access-list 105 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 23 log 
access-list 105 deny ip any any log 
line vty 0 4 
access-class 105 in 
! 
!Enable the router’s logging capability 
logging on 
! 
!Syslog level to be sent to the router console 
logging console warnings 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the router console. 
no logging monitor 
! 
!Set the IP address of the log host 
logging 10.1.2.10 
! 
!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap warnings 
! 
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!set all log messages with the same IP source address of a router interface. 
logging source-interface e1 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 





!Based on NSA 60min Security Guide 
! 
!Disable following servers 
no service tcp-small-servers 
no service udp-small-servers 
no ip bootp server 
no service finger 
no ip http server 
! 
!Disable following services 
no cdp run 
no service config 
no ip source-route 
no ip subnet-zero 
! 
!Configure the console and the virtual terminal lines () to time out a session 
!Require a password at login and to allow only telnet traffic.  
line con 0 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
line aux 0 
no exec 
exec-timeout 0 5 
no login 
transport input none 
line vty 0 4 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
! 
!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 thesis 
! 
!Configure passwords for the console, aux, and the virtual terminal lines. 
!Use a different password for each line.  
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line con 0 
password jennifer 
line aux 0 
password jennifer 
line vty 0 4 
password jennifer 
! 
!Provide protection for above passwords by the following global config cmd. 
service password-encryption 
! 
!Clear out a previous acl 
no access-list 100 
no access-list 102 
no access-list 105 
access-list 100 permit ip 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 any 
access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
! 
!Protect the router against the TCP SYN Attack. 
!denies anyone from any external network from starting any TCP connection 
access-list 100 permit tcp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 established 
! 
access-list 100 permit tcp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
access-list 100 permit ip any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 
! 
! 
!Allow only trusted addresses to port 53 
access-list 100 permit tcp host 10.1.2.6 host 0.0.0.0 eq 53 log 
access-list 100 permit udp host 10.1.2.6 host 0.0.0.0 eq 53 log 
! 
!Block all inbound icmp 
access-list 100 deny icmp any any log 
! 
access-list 100 deny ip any any log 
! 
!Block inbound traceroute from a Unix computer 




ip access-group 100 in 
! 
!Set logging on an extended IP access-list statement 
access-list 102 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 80 
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! 
!Provide IP address spoof protection for outbound traffic from protected network 
(e.g.,10.1.2.0). 
access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!Block all outbound icmp 
access-list 102 deny icmp any any log 
! 




ip address 10.1.2.1 255.255.255.0 
ip access-group 102 in 
! 
!Allow Telnet access from certain computers on the protected network (e.g., 
14.4.4.0) to the router  
!via an extended IP access-list. The administrator can telnet to any interface IP 
address on the  
!router. However, the router converts any interface IP address to 0.0.0.0.  
!Thus, the unusual destination IP address 0.0.0.0 must be used in the access-list. 
access-list 105 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 23 log 
access-list 105 deny ip any any log 
line vty 0 4 
access-class 105 in 
! 
!Enable the router’s logging capability 
logging on 
! 
!Syslog level to be sent to the router console 
logging console Notifications 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the router console. 
no logging monitor 
! 
!Set the IP address of the log host 
logging 10.1.2.10 
! 
!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap Notifications 
! 
!set all log messages with the same IP source address of a router interface. 
logging source-interface e1 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 
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!Based on NSA 60min Security Guide 
! 
!Disable following servers 
no service tcp-small-servers 
no service udp-small-servers 
no ip bootp server 
no service finger 
no ip http server 
! 
!Disable following services 
no cdp run 
no service config 
no ip source-route 
no ip subnet-zero 
! 
!Configure the console and the virtual terminal lines () to time out a session 
!Require a password at login and to allow only telnet traffic.  
line con 0 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
line aux 0 
no exec 
exec-timeout 0 5 
no login 
transport input none 
line vty 0 4 
exec-timeout 5 0 
login 
transport input telnet 
! 
!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 thesis 
! 
!Configure passwords for the console, aux, and the virtual terminal lines. 
!Use a different password for each line.  
line con 0 
password jennifer 
line aux 0 
password jennifer 
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line vty 0 4 
password jennifer 
! 
!Provide protection for above passwords by the following global config cmd. 
service password-encryption 
! 
!Clear out a previous acl 
no access-list 100 
no access-list 102 
no access-list 105 
access-list 100 permit ip 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 any 
access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!Permit only VPN port, which is port 336 
access-list 100 permit tcp any any eq 336 
! 
!Protect the router against the TCP SYN Attack. 
!denies anyone from any external network from starting any TCP connection 
access-list 100 permit tcp any 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 established 
! 
!Block all inbound icmp 
access-list 100 deny icmp any any log 
! 
access-list 100 deny ip any any log 
! 
!Block inbound traceroute from a Unix computer 




ip access-group 100 in 
! 
!Set logging on an extended IP access-list statement 
!access-list 102 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 80 
! 
!Provide IP address spoof protection for outbound traffic from protected network 
(e.g.,10.1.2.0). 
!access-list 102 permit ip 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any 
! 
!Block all outbound icmp 
access-list 102 deny icmp any any log 
! 





ip address 10.1.2.1 255.255.255.0 
ip access-group 102 in 
! 
!Allow Telnet access from certain computers on the protected network (e.g., 
14.4.4.0) to the router  
!via an extended IP access-list. The administrator can telnet to any interface IP 
address on the  
!router. However, the router converts any interface IP address to 0.0.0.0.  
!Thus, the unusual destination IP address 0.0.0.0 must be used in the access-list. 
access-list 105 permit tcp 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 23 log 
access-list 105 deny ip any any log 
line vty 0 4 
access-class 105 in 
! 
!Enable the router’s logging capability 
logging on 
! 
!Syslog level to be sent to the router console 
logging console informational 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the router console. 
no logging monitor 
! 
!Set the IP address of the log host 
logging 10.1.2.10 
! 
!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap debugging 
! 
!set all log messages with the same IP source address of a router interface. 
logging source-interface e1 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 





APPENDIX I – MANAGED SWITCH CONFIGURATION FILES 




!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 jennifer 
enable password jennifer 
! 
!need to clean out prior config file 
no access-list 1 
! 
cdp timer 200 




!specify machines to manage switch 
access-list 1 permit 10.1.2.0 0.255.255.255 
access-list 1 deny any 
line vty 0 4 
access-class 1 in 
! 
!disable unnecessary services 
no ip http server 





ip address 10.1.2.2 255.255.255.0 
! 
!Enable the switch’s logging capability 
logging on 
! 
!Syslog level to be sent to the switchconsole 
logging console errors 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the switchconsole. 
no logging monitor 
! 




!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap errors 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 







!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 jennifer 
enable password jennifer 
! 
!need to clean out prior config file 
no access-list 1 
! 
no cdp timer 
no cdp holdtime 
no cdp run 
! 
!specify machines to manage switch 
access-list 1 permit 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 log 
access-list 1 deny any any log 
line vty 0 4 
access-class 1 in 
! 
!disable unnecessary services 
no ip http server 
no service pad 
! 
!set gateway MAC statically 
!mac-addres-table static <gateway MAC> vlan 1 interface fa0/1 
! 
!set static ARP entry 





ip address 10.1.2.2 255.255.255.0 
! 




!Syslog level to be sent to the switchconsole 
logging console warnings 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the switchconsole. 
no logging monitor 
! 
!Set the IP address of the log host 
logging 10.1.2.10 
! 
!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap warnings 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 







!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 jennifer 
enable password jennifer 
! 
!need to clean out prior config file 
no access-list 1 
! 
no cdp timer 
no cdp holdtime 
no cdp run 
! 
!specify machines to manage switch 
access-list 1 permit 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 log 
access-list 1 deny any any log 
line vty 0 4 
access-class 1 in 
! 
!disable unnecessary services 
no ip http server 






ip address 10.1.2.2 255.255.255.0 
! 
!Enable the switch’s logging capability 
logging on 
! 
!Syslog level to be sent to the switchconsole 
logging console Notifications 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the switchconsole. 
no logging monitor 
! 
!Set the IP address of the log host 
logging 10.1.2.10 
! 
!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap Notifications 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 







!Configure the Enable Secret password, protected by a MD5-based algorithm. 
enable secret 0 jennifer 
enable password jennifer 
! 
!need to clean out prior config file 
no access-list 1 
! 
no cdp timer 
no cdp holdtime 
no cdp run 
! 
!specify machines to manage switch 
access-list 1 permit 10.1.2.0 0.0.0.255 log 
access-list 1 deny any any log 
line vty 0 4 
access-class 1 in 
! 
!disable unnecessary services 
no ip http server 
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ip address 10.1.2.2 255.255.255.0 
! 
!Enable the switch’s logging capability 
logging on 
! 
!Syslog level to be sent to the switchconsole 
logging console informational 
! 
!disable logging to all terminal lines except for the switchconsole. 
no logging monitor 
! 
!Set the IP address of the log host 
logging 10.1.2.10 
! 
!Set the syslog level to be sent to the log host 
logging trap Informational 
! 
!Set the syslog facility type in which log messages are sent 
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